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 A
1 Introduction  
1.1 Aims and scope of work  
 
On 18th October 2006 liner shipping companies became subject to the full force of EC 
competition law. During the first two years, conferences of carriers will remain in existence 
but by 18th October 2008 will cease to exist altogether. With a hardcore restriction of 
competition being removed, this thesis aims to establish what agreements are left for liner 
shipping companies to make amongst themselves.  
 
It is known that price fixing, the most hard core restriction of competition possible, will no 
longer be possible. But the maritime transport industry has shown itself to be as creative as 
European legislators in defining the boundaries of its existence. There are other 
arrangements by which carriers will be able to rationalise their services.  
 
Once established, the remaining agreements between carriers will be examined in the light 
of EC competition law. The focus will be on Article 81 EC. Not only is a full analysis of 
this sector under all EC competition law too wide for the scope of a master thesis, but the 
debate surrounding Article 82 EC and the liner shipping industry is rather more settled, as 
that provision has been applicable for a long time1.  
 
Also outside the scope of this work will be mergers. Whilst they are agreements between 
carriers and in theory could be an alternative to conferences, analysing mergers is a topic 
broad enough for a much larger thesis in its own right. The discussion about mergers has its 
                                                 
1 This topic is fully discussed in Blanco, ‘Shipping Conferences Under EC Antitrust Law’, (2007), at Chapter 
4, p. 407  
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own complexities which are largely independent of a discussion of agreements of a more 
temporary nature between lines under EC Competition law.  
 
Lastly, this is not an economics paper. It is often tempting to enter the interesting debate 
over whether or not price fixing is a legitimate activity for carriers. Or what the impacts of 
the prohibition of liner conferences will have for the profits of liner companies. These are 
ancillary issues. The thrust of this thesis is legal. As such the EC Treaty will be its basis.  
 
The framework of the paper is intended to appeal to the shipping industry’s perspective. 
The legal debate is therefore structured around liner shipping agreement. On the wider 
level, these agreements will be classed into ‘port’, ‘deep-sea/vessel’, ‘cargo’ and ‘other’ 
arrangements. The particular areas studied will include arrangements such as consortia, 
technical agreements, capacity management programmes, the offering of individual service 
contracts and revenue pools. In addition to this, the possibility of multimodal transport 
agreements will be examined.  
 
1.2 The recent debate  
 
The struggle between liner conferences and the economic theory of competition has existed 
for over a century2. In the European Community, where a policy towards the maritime 
transport industry was late to emerge, the issue gained momentum in the late 1970s. This 
coincided with the popularity of the UNCTAD Code on Liner Conferences amongst 
Member States3. The Community’s entry to the area of maritime policy and decision, albeit 
indirectly, that liner conferences were the means by which its shipping was to be organised, 
was politically charged and controversial. Indeed, the life of competition legislation for 
liner shipping has been turbulent ever since the Community’s political core, the Council, 
granted a generous block exemption for liner conferences.  
                                                 
2 See, for example, The Royal Commission in Great Britain and The Alexander report in the United States of 
America, as discussed in Dinger, ‘The Future of Liner Conferences in Europe’, (2004), p.23  
3 The UNCTAD Code on Liner Conferences, (1974)  
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Aside from the academic debate around the legality of the block exemption under the EC 
Treaty, the ECJ and Commission, the enforcers of Community Competition law, have been 
left to construe the provisions as narrowly as possible4. This brought the block exemption’s 
effects, unlimited in time, closer to those envisaged by the Treaty. But it also highlighted 
the paradox the Community found itself in. Competition law is part of the Treaty because it 
is viewed as the best means of ensuring efficient markets, rationalisation, allocation of 
resources and the best possible deal for European consumers.5 The maritime transport 
industry, it is now agreed, is no different from other similar industries from a competition 
point of view. Yet liner conferences, hard core restrictions of competition law and cartels in 
a pure form, roamed freely in and out of European ports. It is no surprise that, as the 
Community has grown stronger and more independent the days of liner conferences have 
become numbered.  
 
The momentum of the debate over the EC’s treatment of liner shipping under competition 
law drew great clarity from an OECD report in 20026. After various reports from the EU 
institutions and the customary back and forth of legislative drafts, the case for ending the 
special treatment of liner carriers reached terminal velocity. Carriers have put forward their 
own arguments in favour of maintaining the block exemption for liner conferences7, but 
even their own statistical evidence has been cited as evidence against their cause8.  
 
Council Regulation 1419/2006 ends one chapter in the life of liner conferences and begins 
what is probably their final chapter in Europe9. The two year phase-out period will see 
some huge changes in the liner shipping world. Competitive conditions already exist in 
                                                 
4 See below at 3.0, EC policies towards liner shipping  
5 Whish, Competition Law, Fifth Edition, (2003), p. 1  
6 OECD Report (2002)  
7 European Liner Affairs Association at www.elaa.net (Last visited on 30th August 2007)  
8 Dinger, page 157. Dinger cites the TSA submission to the OECD, (2001), exhibit 2 & 3; WSC submission 
to the OECD, (2001), page 13 f  
9 Council Regulation 1419/2006, OJ (2006) L 269/1  
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parts of the industry in Europe but it remains to be seen how it will function under fully 
competitive circumstances.  
 
The competition regime has become, following Regulation 1419/2006, a patchwork of 
legislation. Nonetheless, the regime will be simpler than that which is being phased out. As 
stated above, the issue to be discussed here will be what agreements remain. There will be 
no conferences, but carriers may group themselves into consortia and alliances. Carriers 
have also suggested discussion groups and data exchange programmes as alternatives to 
what they saw as the benefits of the conference system10.  
 
More specifically, carriers will no longer be allowed to fix prices to or from European 
ports. The extent to which they can make purely technical agreements will be of interest, as 
the specific ground for such arrangements was part of the now repealed Regulation 
4056/8611. Lastly, less explicit links between carriers, so-called tacit collusion, 
acquiescence and price leadership are areas that carriers need to be aware of to avoid 
falling foul of EC Competition law.  
                                                 
10 Supra, note 7  
11 Article 2, Council Regulation 4056/86, OJ (1986) L 378/4  
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2 THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY  
 
It might seem odd to give an account of the history of liner shipping with a focus on 
conferences, in a study that aims to examine what agreements are left in their absence. 
However I feel it is important to set the scene for the maritime transport industry. The liner 
conference has been one of the dominant organisational structures in liner shipping for the 
most part of the twentieth century. An introduction to their history allows an appreciation 
of their virtues and their weaknesses. Then the legal debate surrounding other agreements 
between carriers can be appreciated for what it achieves without the competitive restriction 
of price fixing. Thereby controversy surrounding EC maritime transport legislation will 
also be better understood.  
 
In addition to an historical glance at conferences, the basic economics of supply and 
demand are clarified. It is important to understand why certain shipping agreements were 
deemed necessary by legislatures and why ‘competition’ as a theory is so important. In the 
final section of this part, the subject matter of the forthcoming legal analysis of EC 
shipping legislation ‘after’ conferences is closer in mind. Then consortia, alliances, 
discussion agreements and information exchange are outlined.  
 
2.1 Liner shipping  
 
The subject of this work is liner shipping and the companies, lines, which operate within 
that industry. Broadly speaking liner shipping is the transport of goods by sea 
internationally. But it can be distinguished from the various other forms of international 
maritime transport. Liner shipping operates on a regular basis. In other words, there is a 
timetable to be followed. This distinguishes ‘liner’ from ‘tramp’ shipping. There is no 
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specific type of cargo transported by lines but some commentators have made the 
distinction between bulk carriers and liner shipping companies in this way.12  
 
The European Commission, hereafter ‘the Commission’, has defined liner shipping as 
follows:  
“…the transport of goods on a regular basis on a particular route or routes 
between ports and in accordance with timetables and sailing dates advertised in 
advance and available, even on an occasional basis, to any transport user against 
payment.”13   
 
It is this sector of the maritime transport industry, and the effect that EC competition law 
has on it, that this work is concerned with.  
 
2.2 Shipping before 1875  
 
Many accounts of liner conferences begin by pointing out that the first liner conference 
came about in 1875. Before the late nineteenth century the shipping industry was 
characterised by the sailing ship14. Sailings were irregular and unreliable. Imbalances of 
cargo in the opposite directions of a given route and unpredictable cargo volumes dogged 
the business of carriers. The important link to be drawn from this era is that between new 
technology - steam - and a surplus of capacity.15 Steam improved not only the speed of 
vessels but also their predictability. Regular sailings were introduced and demand for 
transport increased as perishable and valuable goods could be carried long distances16. 
Carrying capacity was further increased by improved engine design and the move from 
coal to liquid fuels17. Freight rates tumbled in the face of rising demand.  
                                                 
12 Marx, International Shipping Cartels, (1953),  pp. 7-9  
13 Article 2(2), Commission Regulation 823/2000, OJ (2000) L 100/24  
14 Marx, p. 26  
15 Marx, p. 31  
16 Marx, p. 26 
17 Deakin, ‘Shipping Conferences’, (1973), p.211  
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However, this increase in demand was outstripped easily by an increase in supply. Steam 
ships were larger than sailing vessels anyway but had the added advantage of fitting in 
more sailings for a given period of time. The increase in international transport capacity 
was thereby heightened indirectly.  
 
Some commentators have also attributed factors outside the increased efficiency of carriers 
to the rise of world shipping. Economics, improvements to the world’s infrastructure and 
politics have all played their parts. Globalisation was beginning in earnest18. The world had 
woken up to the fact that commercial activity and services in far away places could affect 
their own work. By means of shipping services, these markets were now accessible. 
Furthermore, the Europe to Asia trade was eased by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, 
again meaning more sailings and an indirect increase in supply. Political factors played 
their part; the British Empire was in full economic swing and many governments of the 
recently industrialised nations were eager to put in place policies for protecting companies 
flying their flags and for improving their balance of payments. These factors culminated in 
a huge increase in demand world shipping. But as stated above, this increase in demand did 
not match the capacity being supplied.  
 
2.3 The economics of supply and demand and the emergence of liner 
conferences  
 
Generally, the equality of supply and demand will produce stable prices. Assuming this is a 
competitive market, one in which firms compete and determine policies independently, an 
excess of supply over demand will cause prices to fall. They will continue to fall until 
supply again equals demand.19  
 
                                                 
18 Wickizer, ‘Shipping and Freight Rates in the overseas Grain trade’, Wheat Studies of the Food Research 
Institute, Vol. XV, No. 2 (1938), p. 49. Cited in Marx at p. 26  
19 On the theory of competition generally, see Whish, p. 2  
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The situation in which carriers found themselves in the early 1870s, and helped to create, 
was particularly severe20. Supply, or the capacity of transport, exceeded demand by a long 
way. A recession in 1873 exacerbated this situation by further reducing demand21 and 
prices for international maritime transport declined quickly.22 This was a competitive 
market, so carriers were undercutting each others’ rates. The outlook seemed to be 
instability until there were enough bankruptcies for capacity to drop and supply to 
eventually equal demand again. Prices could then stabilise to profitable levels and the 
process, one could presume, would start all over again.  
 
Again generally, there are several ways for suppliers to halt losses due to price instability in 
a downward direction. At their heart they involve the end of effective competition and thus 
the proposition that equality in actual supply and demand will produce stable prices. One 
way to do this is via pinning prices at artificially high levels. This could be achieved by 
making only one price available to consumers – price fixing. The higher prices paid by 
consumers will make the operation profitable once more.  
 
Alternatively it is done by changing the dynamics of the market. Suppliers cannot affect 
demand for a product. But supply is theirs to manipulate. By holding back supply, 
producers artificially equalise supply and demand. In accordance with the above 
proposition, prices should become stable. Both solutions require collusion between the 
producers or suppliers. Without collusion, prices will simply destabilise. Artificially high 
prices could easily be undercut by one carrier. Similarly, artificially held-back supply could 
be allocated to the market by one rogue supplier.  
 
Carriers had to fix prices or reduce capacity, or both, to end the problems they found 
themselves in. Crucially, however, they had to do this together as suppliers. By presenting 
a united front to shippers they could demand higher prices for their services, maintaining 
healthy profits. To achieve just this, the first liner conference emerged in 1875.  
                                                 
20 Dinger, p. 22; Competition was described as “Cutthroat”  
21 Dinger, p.22  
22 Marx, p. 31  
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2.4 The functioning of liner conferences  
 
Conferences are agreements between international liner shipping companies under which 
prices and other conditions of carriage are agreed23. The agreements stipulate various rights 
and obligations upon members but typically the individual companies maintain 
independence in a large number of areas including the offering of individual service 
contracts and loyalty rebates. A trend has developed, particularly in the United States, to 
unrestrainedly offer transport to shippers based upon individual service contracts24. This 
has to some extent ended the efficacy of conferences. Each conference has its own 
peculiarities and generalisation would be unhelpful in such a necessarily brief 
introduction25.  
 
2.5 Containerisation, consortia and alliances  
 
The use of liner conferences continued through the first and second World Wars26. But 
following the Second World War there was a new revolution afoot for liner shipping27. In 
the mid-1960s break bulk transport began to be replaced by containerised transport. 
Nowadays it is estimated that just over half of all general cargo is transported by container, 
out of a possible 65% of general cargo suitable for containers28. The sector is continuing to 
grow rapidly29.  
 
The switch to containers makes perfect sense. Containers are easier to shift around. This 
reduces time spent in port and allows for more integrated multimodal transport – door to 
                                                 
23 Article 1 (3) (b), Council Regulation 4056/86  
24 Article 8(1)(c), section 5(c), Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998, 112 Stat. 1902  
25 For a thorough analysis, see Herman, ‘Shipping Conferences’, (1983), p.15 
26 Marx, p. 6   
27 Herman, p.6  
28 Dinger, p.29  
29 Dinger, p. 29  
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door services. Reduced port time means reduced port costs and more time spent at sea. As 
was the case with the introduction of steam vessels, transport capacity was increased 
because of bigger, faster vessels and more frequent sailings. Customers felt the benefits of 
faster transport exactly where they wanted, with fewer packaging or security problems.  
 
But the switch was an expensive one. Most operators could not afford the expensive new 
vessels that containerisation demanded30. The containers themselves could match the price 
of new vessels. Furthermore, new port facilities were necessary. Typically for the shipping 
industry, the solution was a collective one. Consortia are agreements that provide the 
framework for greater operational cooperation between carriers. Commission Regulation 
823/2000, discussed in more detail below, states that consortia are agreements aiming to 
“…rationalise their operations by means of technical, operational and/or commercial 
arrangements, with the exception of price fixing”31. In essence consortia allow liner 
shipping companies to afford space on container vessels, albeit not their own at times. They 
allow for access to container facilities in ports and an opportunity to compete in markets 
they might otherwise be priced out of. Liner shipping companies may be members of 
conferences and consortia contemporaneously.  
 
Consortia agreements have been extended into what are called ‘alliances’.32 Alliances 
appeared in the early 1990s and operate more integrated transport services around the 
globe, aimed at operational rationalisation33. This is as opposed to operating on one trade 
lane or route, as consortia usually do. Neither consortia nor alliance agreements constitute 
mergers due to their undoubted temporary character and the individuality retained by the 
carriers.  
                                                 
30 Herman, p.6  
31 Article 2 (1), Commission Regulation 823/2000  
32 OECD Report at 2.7.2, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/46/2553902.pdf (last visited 30/08/2007)  
33 Dinger, pp. 30-34  
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2.6 Discussion agreements and information exchange  
 
Carriers in the liner trade have developed discussion agreements as forms of cooperation 
that are not as competitively-restrictive as conferences. Typically a discussion agreement 
will include any operators on a route, conference members or not.  Between them, these 
companies will agree to adopt the same market behaviour. This might be, amongst other 
things, agreeing capacity restrictions or various surcharges.  
 
Information exchange arrangements have been proposed by liner conferences in the 
realisation that they might soon be unable to carry on as such.34 Carriers would agree to 
divulge certain information to eachother regularly under the proposed system.35 This allows 
them to increase market transparency. Many commentators have been sceptical of 
information exchange for its potential abuse by carriers in coordinating market behaviour36.  
 
                                                 
34 Supra, note 7   
35 On information exchange, see Blanco, p. 590  
36 Furse, ‘Competition Law of the EC and the UK’, Fifth Edition, (2006), p.149; Furse makes the point that 
competition policy should ‘make such information exchange risky.’ 
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3 EC POLICIES TOWARDS LINER SHIPPING  
 
This section has the aim of laying out the competition legislation so far adopted by the 
Community towards liner shipping. The purpose here is not to detail the provisions in any 
specific way; rather I wish to inform the reader of the thought process European legislators 
have followed in this area. In the same way that a description of the historical development 
of conferences was important, the following discussion should set the scene for an analysis 
of what future agreements are permissible under European Community competition law. 
The initial paragraphs are focused on liner conferences until the present day, and more 
recent ’conference’ developments. Following this I will discuss other Community 
secondary legislation concerning the currently more important ‘consortia’ and the block 
exemptions granted in that sector.   
 
The European Community did not gain a meaningful approach towards competition law in 
the maritime transport industry until 1986. The irony in this is the importance to the 
Community of shipping. However this importance may also go some way towards 
explaining the delayed action. Member States, particularly since the accession of Denmark, 
the United Kingdom and later Greece, are fairly guarded towards one of their most 
important industries. Pooling sovereignty in such an area is perhaps a difficult pill to 
swallow37. For the Community, shipping’s importance emerged after it stopped being only 
a large bloc of continental Europe and its outlook became increasingly international.  
                                                 
37 Until the Single European Act of 1986, unanimity in the Council was required to legislate on maritime 
transport. From 1986 ‘qualified majority’ was the rule.  
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3.1 The UNCTAD Code and Council Regulation 954/79  
 
In various stages there was a shift from purely economic cooperation to a greater, social 
aim in Europe. Shipping straddles the two – it is a hugely important economic activity but 
also a public service. Thus it had been treated with some indecision. The distinction, 
however, became less important as Community competence grew. Regarding maritime 
transport and competition law, a transition started in the late 1970s, triggered by the 
emergence of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner conferences38.  
 
The UNCTAD Code is a model of behaviour for liner conferences. It is also an attempt to 
give developing countries access to shipping markets and the chance to develop merchant 
fleets of their own. It was a popular move in the eyes of many Member States of the 
European Community. However, signatures to the code caused tension within the 
Community, particularly with regard to the EC Treaty. The Community reacted by passing 
Council Regulation 954/79 with the attempt of allowing developing countries fair market 
entry, whilst bringing Member States’ involvement into line with the EC Treaty. Crucially, 
the Council effectively endorsed liner conferences as the Community’s international 
maritime transport of choice.39   
 
3.2 Council Regulation 4056/86  
 
This indirect legitimisation of liner conferences was legally on shaky ground, particularly 
in light of case law developments40. Cases before the ECJ had extended the Treaty’s 
                                                 
38 UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, (1974), http://r0.unctad.org/ttl/ttl-docs-legal.htm (Last 
visited 30/08/2007)  
39 It is interesting to note that today the Code is not used in practice, and there have been no new accessions 
since the early 1990s. Commission proposal for a Council Regulation repealing Regulation 4056/86, 
2005/0264 (CNS)  
40 See 3.3   
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competition rules fully to the maritime sector. At the same time, the Community had 
ostensibly chosen liner conferences, price fixing cartels, to operate in this sector. This 
tension between the maritime sector and the EC Treaty needed to be addressed by the 
Community. 
 
A crisis in community shipping and the legal paradox that had arisen were dealt with in a 
job-lot of regulations appearing in 1986. Of importance to this study is Council Regulation 
4056/8641. The regulation was intended to bring the maritime sector fully into the EC 
Treaty’s focus for the first time. Liner conferences were granted, inter alia, a block 
exemption for price fixing, capacity management programmes, pooling arrangements and 
various technical agreements. It is interesting to note that the block exemption is generous 
in the extreme, granting a right to a hard-core restriction of competition for an unlimited 
period of time. The fact that it is a regulation from the Council, the most politicised 
institution of the Union, adds weight to earlier comments that EC shipping policy is 
controversial and heavily influenced by member states. A block exemption of this sort is 
the perfect tool for member states to retain sovereignty over of a nationally important 
industry.  
 
3.3 The applicability of the EC Treaty  
 
Running parallel to the Commission and Council activity were rulings from the European 
Court of Justice. Several fundamental questions had arisen in relation to the EC Treaty 
itself. Fundamentally the questions consisted of asking what areas of the Treaty applied to 
maritime transport. If the Treaty did apply generally, it was further questioned whether 
Title VI on competition law applied. Finally, confirmation was sought that, although 
Article 82 EC applied directly, Article 81 EC required further explanatory legislation.  
 
                                                 
41 In spite of its huge importance over the past 21 years to European shipping, no details of the Regulation 
will be analysed. The Regulation has been repealed and it is the aim of this paper to look at what agreements 
lie ahead.  
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The answer to the first of these questions came in 1974. The Commission had taken action 
against France who, obliged under its Code du Travail, required a certain number of French 
sailors on board vessels flying its flag42. The Commission asserted that this was 
contradictory to one of the four driving factors behind European economic integration – the 
free movement of workers. In response it was claimed that the EC Treaty did not apply 
generally to the transport sector. Only Title V on transport, it was claimed, contained the 
relevant provisions for that industry.   
 
The ECJ analysed this claim in light of the provisions of Title V and in particular Article 
80(2) EC. The Court was keen to avoid the label of ‘free movement of services’ to the 
actions of France. Maritime transport had been explicitly excluded from the free movement 
of services43. The judges therefore adopted the phrase ‘free movement of sailors’ 
throughout, clearly bringing the case within the free movement of workers. No such 
exclusion existed there. Further, the Court addressed the claim that Title V on transport 
existed independently of the Treaty’s general provisions. It declared that Title V was 
actually intended to be as much subject to the Treaty’s general provisions as other titles. 
Together, they gave effect to the fundamental aims of the Community in the transport 
sector. As such the existence of Title V does not restrict the application of the remainder of 
the EC Treaty to Community transport.  
 
This general proposition was tested more specifically in 1986. The applicability of the 
Treaty’s competition law provisions to maritime transport was examined in the Nouvelles 
Frontieres decision from the ECJ44. Title VI of the Treaty, regarding competition law, was 
declared to be fully applicable to the transport sector. Maritime transport and thus liner 
conferences were thereby subject to the competition provisions. It is interesting to note that 
in the same year the block exemption contained in Regulation 4056/86 was granted.  
 
                                                 
42 Case 167/73, Commission v France, (1974), ECR, p.359   
43 Article 51(1)  EC  
44 Joint cases 209-213/84, ‘Nouvelles Frontieres’, (1986), ECR, p.1425  
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With the block exemption in place there were no immediate legal consequences to the 
detailed application of the competition rules in Article 81 EC for a large part of the 
maritime transport industry. Nonetheless, in 1989 the case of Ahmed Saeed came before the 
ECJ45. Therein the Court stated that Article 82 EC was applicable without any need for 
further legislation. Article 81 EC, however, required such secondary legislation due to the 
possibility of block exemptions contained in Article 81(3) EC. Such detailed secondary 
legislation has gained importance since the implementation of self-assessment under 
Council Regulation1/2003.46  
 
In summary, the ECJ confirmed the competences of the Community, within the framework 
of the Treaty, by establishing that the transport sector fell under the general provisions of 
the Treaty. Liner shipping was thus declared to be subject to the Treaty, including its 
competition provisions.    
 
3.4 Liner consortia  
 
As indicated earlier, one of the major contrasts to the repeal of the conference block 
exemption is the continuing strength of liner consortia. In discussing the EC’s legal regime 
for liner shipping, consortia have to be involved, particularly in light of their increasingly 
isolated position of being exempted from EC competition law. An analysis of the contents 
of that block exemption will be undertaken at a later stage.  
 
The first block exemption for consortia came about in 199547 and has since been renewed 
twice48. Regulation 611/2005 grants a further five years for liner consortia, the fundamental 
aspects of which have already been briefly outlined. It has been remarked that the 
                                                 
45, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reissebuero GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs e. V, Case 66/86 [1989] ECR 803, [1990] 4 CMLR 102, ECJ  
46 Council Regulation 1/2003, OJ (2003) L 1/1  
47 Commission Regulation 870/1995, OJ (1995) L 89/7  
48 Commission Regulation 823/2000, OJ (2000) L 100/24 and Commission Regulation 611/2005, OJ (2005) L 
101/10  
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controversy surrounding liner conferences is not apparent around the liner consortia. This 
manifests itself in the uncomplicated manner in which the Commission regulations grant 
them their status, containing few recitals and clear, straight forward provisions. It seems 
that many lessons have been learned from the conference block exemption.  
 
3.5 Recent developments  
 
In comparison to the twenty year conference block exemption and the controversy that has 
surrounded it, recent developments have been swift. In 2002 the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published a report into the state of the 
liner shipping industry.49 The report was heavily critical of the prevalence of conferences in 
the liner shipping industry. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the report, however, was 
the assertion that the liner shipping industry is not unique.  
 
Often, liner conferences have claimed ‘uniqueness’ as one justification for their existence 
in spite of competition law.50 Their industry, they say, lacks stability from within. High 
costs of market participation and ‘lumpy’ supply of capacity were pointed to in this regard. 
In addition, some commentators have discussed the so-called ‘theory of the empty core’ to 
explain the unique combination of market factors in liner shipping. Thereby, the instability 
of prices is explained by cycles of market players leaving while prices were unprofitable, 
only re-joining the market when their competitors’ remaining capacity, more suited to 
demand, had dragged prices up to being profitable again. The OECD’s report, however, has 
dismissed the uniqueness of liner shipping.  
 
The OECD instead approved of a competitive market structure and recommended the 
abolition of conferences.51 Cooperation in itself was not condemned and the report was 
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approving of the use of consortia. In light of this and prior calls from shippers to end the 
use of liner conferences, the European Commission began its own review of the industry.  
 
The culmination of the efforts of the European Institutions in this area was Council 
Regulation 1419/2006. Support for the abolition of the conference system seems to have 
come from many sides of the debate and, as mentioned earlier, even from the statistics 
produced by liner conferences. Regulation 1419/2006 is not a long regulation, signifying 
the simplicity of the changes it introduces. The ramifications of these changes will be 
discussed in the coming chapters. At its core the new legislation repeals the block 
exemption from EC competition law granted under Regulation 4056/86, following a two 
year phase-out for conferences already in existence.  
 
3.6 Summary  
 
Legislation in the area of maritime transport has been some of the most politically charged 
legislation under EC competition law. The 1986 block exemption was granted when 
reports, with the benefit of hindsight, have claimed that it probably should not have been. 
The repeal of that legislation has left in place various legal provisions concerning liner 
shipping that will be discussed in detail below. Chiefly, there is the liner consortia block 
exemption.  
 
It will be necessary to establish what liner shipping companies can achieve within this 
legislation and where exactly its boundaries lie. It will also be of interest, considering the 
aim of this paper, to establish what the maritime transport industry can achieve through 
consortia in the form of alliances and other arrangements. I will be concerned in this 
respect with agreements between liner shipping undertakings.      
 S
4 AGREEMENTS IN LINER SHIPPING  
4.1 Structure of discussion  
 
In analysing liner shipping agreements under EC competition law, it is first necessary to 
look at what agreements are under consideration. Once we have established what liner 
shipping companies want to do through agreements with eachother, we should look at the 
applicable law. In liner shipping this is a slightly more technical affair than in other 
industries. This is due to the secondary legislation produced by the Council and 
Commission to supplement the Treaty and to regulate the maritime sector.  
 
The competition law assessment of agreements will fall under Article 81 EC – the 
prohibition itself through Article 81(1) EC and the individual exemption under Article 
81(3) EC. More specifically, we can look to secondary legislation. It will be important to 
examine the effects of Regulation 1419/2006 to see what other legislation remains 
following the repeal of Regulation 4056/86. Of particular interest in this regard will be 
technical agreements that once fell under Article 2 of the repealed regulation. Lastly, 
specific secondary legislation for liner shipping agreements, already outlined above, will be 
discussed in detail. This analysis will stem from Regulation 611/2005, which extends 
Regulation 823/2000 on consortia.  
 
The assimilation of the applicable law and those relevant agreements is not so straight 
forward. Many legal studies of liner shipping, notably those of liner conferences, have 
adopted a legal structure. That is to say, liner shipping is placed within the framework of 
the applicable legal provisions. To a great extent, this is a sensible approach. Good law is 
drafted in such a way as to fit the industry it is regulating. The approach also has the 
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advantage of reaching suitable legal conclusions that can be considered in wider bodies of 
law such as ‘commercial’, ‘private international’ or, more pertinently, ‘competition law’.  
 
However, I feel drawn to approach this subject from another angle; to apply the relevant 
law to the structures that the liner shipping industry itself has adopted. An example might 
be: what are the various agreements that liner shipping companies can make in port? The 
obvious appeal of this approach is that meaningful conclusions are drawn on practical 
competition law problems in liner shipping. One drawback, however, is the scale of such an 
analysis. To take the law out of its natural habitat – the Treaty and regulations – and begin 
applying it to the numerous agreements that liner companies wish to make, would be 
lengthy to say the least. Such a study could also, without a careful structure, become 
clumsy and lethargic.  
 
These problems are compounded by the fact that this is a master thesis. The proposed 
analysis would have a scale beyond that permissible. A detailed analysis would be of 
greater appeal than simply skimming the surface, but is not possible here. In addition to 
concerns of brevity, it would be sage to avoid a muddled and artificial structure. This could 
easily rear its head should the analysis lack sufficient depth. Because of these 
considerations, I have chosen to adopt an analysis of the area through examples of specific 
problems for liner shipping companies under four broad headings. These headings and 
problems are laid out below, outlining the agreements under consideration before detailing 
the applicable law.  
 
 
4.2 Liner shipping agreements  
 
Liner shipping is largely a private industry. It therefore exists to pursue profits and its 
participants will be concerned to maintain healthy rewards for its efforts. Assuming the 
industry follows a competitive model which, under the Treaty, European liner shipping will 
do in its entirety from October 2008, lines will be primarily concerned with maximising 
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efficiency and cutting costs, thereby increasing their profits. Because of this economies of 
scale are very important.52 Also, liner shipping is a heavily capital-intensive market.53 
Buying new vessels, equipping them with containers if needed and supplying the requisite 
port facilities is a mean logistical feat, and very expensive. Given these facts, collaboration 
amongst liner shipping companies seems necessary. This necessity is brought to light in the 
activities of liner shipping companies and the high costs involved. Some commentators 
have placed figures on the costs of vessels and containers to illumine the problem.54 
Wherever there is an operation with high start-up or running costs, it is likely that lines of 
all sizes will seek agreement with their competitors. Below, these agreements have been 
divided into four areas: Port, Deep-sea, Cargo and Other. It should be noted again that this 
discussion is focused on inter-line agreements and not agreements between lines and 
shippers, with the exception of individual service contracts.   
 
4.2.1 Agreements in port  
 
Liner shipping operates between ports and, importantly, out of ports. That is to say, the port 
is a base at which all of the real movement of the cargo happens. In an extreme version of 
events, liner companies would have to provide an entire port facility to make a transport 
operation possible. Setting aside the fact that this is really the responsibility of government, 
many different aspects of a port would have to be provided – and all are expensive. No 
doubt, lines would look to collaborate at this level if they had to. We can assume that the 
basics are in place – the infrastructure is sound, the port dredged, any environmental 
impacts taken care of and any other matters settled.  
 
However there is still a lot to be done before a line can operate out of a port. Indeed, 
deciding which ports are to be operated out of might be an agreement that needs to be 
settled in itself. After all, if two companies agree to share the cost and use of containers, 
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but neither operates in the same ports, that agreement is almost futile. If the same port is 
served, facilities must be installed for various operations. Cargo must be stored somewhere 
where it is protected from the elements, thieves and saboteurs; any special treatment like 
refrigerated facilities, must be provided. Vessels need proper berths and docking facilities. 
All of these things also require a lot of equipment and spare parts, not to mention the 
containers and container-shifting tools. And, of course, the whole operation needs staffing. 
Ensuring a smooth running enterprise might also require an operations office, whether in 
the port itself or a regional centre.  
 
In short, there are many ways to share costs within a port. In the same way that spreading 
the costs allows for better profits, agreement in the areas outlined above also enables better 
market access.  Risks involved in a new venture, or in serving a new port, are greatly 
reduced if there are other liner shipping companies there to shoulder some of the burden. 
Further along the line consumers benefit from a well-served port and a choice of 
competitive lines.  
 
The legal bases for agreements in port are found mainly in Regulation 611/2005. However, 
there are some technical agreements that were detailed in the now repealed regulation 
4056/86 that could still be used today. After all, technical agreements in themselves do not 
prevent, restrict or distort competition. ‘Port agreement’ is an area of liner collaboration 
that is not particularly controversial and, as such, will only be touched upon lightly, 
although a legal analysis of the character of article 2 regulation 4056/86 will be of interest.  
 
4.2.2 Deep-sea/vessel agreements  
 
Under this heading are agreements that affect vessel operation. There is one area of 
particular interest here – that of capacity management. This can be a necessary area for 
agreement in liner shipping for maintaining regularity and as a reaction to seasonal changes 
in volume of cargo. The economics of supply and demand, explained above, are affected by 
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capacity management. In turn, they can affect prices.55 As such, capacity management is 
potentially severely restrictive of competition. A strong legal ground for waiving the 
prohibition of Article 81(1) EC is essential. The details of such a ground, contained in the 
consortia block exemption, are discussed later. That analysis will include whether it would 
be sensible to revisit case law, now that liner conferences are no longer permissible, to 
expand the scope of capacity management.  
 
Aside from capacity management, there are many ‘deep-sea’ agreements that might be best 
served by collaborative arrangements. Starting at as fundamental a position as in port 
agreements, lines may wish to coordinate their routes, although in actual fact this is nearly 
the same thing as agreeing which ports are to be served. Timetable coordination is another 
fairly basic form of ensuring the operation of a good service. Prima facie, coordination of 
lines in these ways does not contain any elements that are overbearingly restrictive of 
competition and both positively contribute to the deal gotten by shippers.  
 
In terms of the vessels themselves, liner shipping companies will be interested in utilising 
as much transport capacity as is available, negating the need to run unprofitably empty 
vessels. In this regard, vessel pooling is an obvious solution. However the use of slot 
chartering, hiring capacity on collaborators’ vessels, can mitigate losses through fully 
utilising capacity. It is true to say that slot chartering effectively allows lines to temporarily 
increase their own capacity and thus business opportunities. All this is done without the 
expensive and permanent outlay involved in buying a ship and the less flexible alternative 
of a charter party.  
 
Aiding any system aimed at flexible capacity and vessel pooling might be agreements on 
how vessel capacity should, if at all, be chartered outside the carriers’ agreement. Exclusive 
use of tonnage by the collaborators, as well as the compulsory use of ‘agreement tonnage’ 
and not that of third parties, will serve to strengthen the full use of capacity of any member 
lines to the capacity programmes described above.  
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Lastly, as under port agreements, technical agreements have a part to play in vessel and 
deep-sea arrangements. Of interest in this manner are vessel type agreements. Under such 
an arrangement only certain categories of vessels may be used by members. The origin of 
such agreements, legally speaking, lay in Article 2 of the liner conference block exemption. 
As such vessel type agreements will form part of the analysis of that article in light of the 
block exemption’s repeal in 2006. Capacity management agreements are also discussed in 
greater detail below. The other aforementioned ‘deep-sea’ agreements have reasonably 
strong legal bases and as such will not need a great deal of further consideration.  
 
4.2.3 Cargo agreements  
 
Some types of collaboration useful in relation to cargo have been indicated already. But 
‘cargo agreements’ is a wider category than simply logistical rationalisation. It includes 
commercial arrangements and agreements made by liner shipping companies with shippers 
– individual service contracts. Cargo cooperation concerns, at its most simplistic, cargo 
handling and storage facilities. This includes certain port facilities and containers. There is 
obviously overlap in this area with ‘port agreements’ above. They are further means of 
achieving economies of scale. Not being overly controversial, it will be sufficient later to 
briefly outline these agreements’ legal grounds.  
 
Of a more complex nature are cargo sharing agreements. Under such arrangements cargo is 
pooled, and assigned to the different carrier-members on pre-defined rules. This is an area 
that would warrant further discussion given the opportunity. For the reasons stated above, 
this is not possible. Cargo pools clearly form an area that demands attention in light of EC 
competition law. However, that area has too solid an exemption from that law56, and is too 
flagrant a breach of it without the exemption, to be discussed further. Whilst this oversight 
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is unfortunate, it will allow for the requisite attention to be paid to other agreements in the 
area of cargo, such as individual service contracts.  
 
An individual service contract, or ‘service arrangement’, is described in Community 
legislation as:  
 
 ‘a contractual arrangement concluded between one or more transport users and an 
individual member of a consortium or a consortium itself under which, in return for an 
undertaking, to commission the transport of a certain quantity of goods over a given period 
of time, a user receives an individual undertaking from the consortium member or the 
consortium to provide an individualised service which is of a given quality and specially 
tailored to its needs’.57 
 
So agreements with shippers, by a consortium or its members, may be made in pursuit of 
better-tailored service and a guarantee of stability for both the shipper and carriers. 
Individual service contracts, although grounded solidly within the consortia block 
exemption58, are perhaps most representative of this category of agreements. Amongst 
other reasons, this is because of the breadth of the scope of these agreements. They will be 
examined in light of the EC’s legal provisions later on, in so far as agreements between 
liner shipping companies may be made to offer individual service contracts.  
 
4.2.4 Other cooperation in liner shipping  
 
Considering the above categories, there are some agreements that do not fit neatly into one 
or the other. Some of them have a commercial aspect to them that does not lend itself to 
being placed into ‘port’, ‘deep-sea’ or ‘cargo’. Others straddle all three categories and are 
therefore equally unsuitable for such categories. This overlap is unsurprising given that the 
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entire liner shipping operation revolves around cargo. Feasibly, all agreements could be 
placed under ‘cargo’. The ‘other’ category encompasses four agreements that lines could 
wish to make. Price fixing is a notable exception from this, and all other, categories for the 
simple reason that such a hard core restriction of competition has been shown not to satisfy 
the requirements of article 81(3) EC.59  
 
The overlap noted above is particularly apparent where lines might want to agree on data 
exchange systems. Such systems will be important to other agreements, right across the 
three other categories. Logistics generally rely on complex data and this has become no less 
true in the age of the container. Cargo sharing and slot chartering complicate those 
processes further, and agreements concerning the joint issuing of documentation, such as 
bills of lading, will be eased through streamlined systems.  
 
Of those agreements in this category to which there is a commercial character are seen 
revenue pooling and joint sales and marketing. Joint sales and marketing are 
understandable advantages to carriers who are engaged in such close-knit activities as, say, 
consortia. It is an extension of their ability to compete in their chosen market. Revenue 
pools, however, could theoretically attain a political charge close to that of liner 
conferences. Under such a scheme, the cargo carried by a line is irrelevant, all the revenue 
being pooled and split between members on a pre-defined set of rules.60  
 
Although under a study of liner conferences, Dinger states that it is in fact the purpose of 
revenue pools to eliminate competition between member lines. 61 Herman submits that liner 
conferences were formed in response to market conditions and that pools take this 
collaborative effort one step further.62 In light of the fact that conferences themselves are 
now much criticised, are pools not also to be criticised? Like individual service contracts 
under ‘cargo’, it will be interesting to examine the specific legal provisions allowing for 
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revenue pooling in spite of what, as will be shown, a solid legal base under the consortia 
block exemption.  
 
But revenue pools are not the only potential agreements in the current category that are 
capable of drumming up a debate and warrant further discussion. Multimodal transport is a 
topic that has split even the European Community institutions63. The wish on behalf of 
carriers to offer door-to-door services, beyond the main shipping routes sailed, is 
understandably strong. Shippers, it must be presumed, want such services. For carriers, 
agreements of this kind would open up markets more quickly, expand their potential 
customer base and allow them to offer a more complete transport package at a reduced cost 
and risk to themselves. As of yet there does not appear to be a Community policy on 
multimodal transport. Along with revenue pools, multimodal transport will be examined in 
greater detail later.  
 
4.3 Summary  
 
In summary, the four categories will be examined through five examples. These are:  
 
a. Technical agreements following the repeal of regulation 4056/86, including 
vessel type agreements;  
b. Capacity management programmes in light of the Community case law and the 
repeal of regulation 4056/86;  
c. Individual service contracts as offered by groups of liner shipping companies;  
d. Revenue pooling; and  
e. Multimodal transport.  
 
In addition to the above, it is to be borne in mind that explicit agreements are by no means 
the only possible restriction to competition under EC competition law. Concerted practices, 
including tacit collusion, lend themselves nicely to markets dominated by a few firms. Such 
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markets are given the economic label ‘oligopolistic markets’, the effects of which will be 
discussed later on in the context of liner shipping.  
 
At this point it should be pointed out that the adopted categorisation is only truly useful in a 
full discussion. Any redundancy of the categories that may appear from the foregoing 
discussion is down to limitations placed on this study. Reaching out at a few of the 
‘meaningful conclusions’ mentioned above is what this paper sets out to do.  
 
  
 Å
 
5 THE APPLICABLE LAW – ARTICLE 81 EC AND THE COMMUNITY’S 
MARITIME REGIME AFTER REGULATION 1419/2006  
 
As indicated, this study diverges from the traditional structure of a legal paper, as it follows 
the agreements or joint ventures that liner shipping companies make. The relevant law, to 
be established below, will be applied based on that structure. The maritime transport sector 
is not one in which a straight forward application of Article 81 EC is the correct approach. 
The specialised secondary legislation outlined above includes a block exemption for 
agreements conforming to the definition of liner consortia in Regulation 823/2000, 
provided certain obligations are met. Furthermore another piece of recent secondary 
legislation, Regulation 1419/2006, has revealed a temporary patchwork of legislation for 
Community maritime transport. The effects of this regulation and the legislation that it 
leaves behind will be examined below. Following that will be an analysis of the block 
exemption for liner consortia.  
 
The last relevant legal provision to be looked at will be the Treaty itself - Article 81 EC. 
The reason for discussing this last out of the legal provisions is simplicity. Having adopted 
an unorthodox structure the focus has been placed on the structure of liner shipping. If 
specialised secondary legislation can be applied to those agreements, as is more likely than 
not, Article 81 EC need not be considered. Those agreements will have been exempted 
from its scope. As such, the legal landscape for this work is dominated by the specialised 
secondary legislation, reinforced by the prohibition in Article 81(1) EC and, importantly, 
the possibility of an individual exemption under Article 81(3) EC.  
 
 AA
5.1 The legal landscape post - Regulation 1419/2006  
 
Following an uncharacteristically brief assessment of the Community’s maritime sector, the 
Council adopted a regulation that embodied the changes deemed necessary. In short, 
Council regulation 1419/2006 repeals the liner conference block exemption over a two year 
transitional period. Furthermore, tramp and cabotage operations are brought under the 
ambit of Regulation 1/2003, the ‘Modernisation Regulation’. For our purposes, whilst the 
latter regulation will be important, the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 is more significant.  
 
The efforts of liner conferences in Europe, through ELAA, were to some extent seen as 
putting off the inevitable. Certainly the repeal of the block exemption for liner conferences 
reflects this by allowing for a two year phase out period. This will end on 18 October 2008. 
The provisions of Regulation 4056/86 left in place during this period include Articles 3 to 
7, Article 8(2) and Article 26. These provisions only apply to conferences in place at the 
date of the repeal. They permit the block exemption and conditions relating thereto for two 
years. Furthermore, the ability of the Commission to withdraw the exemption is 
maintained, as is the ability of the Commission to alter the scope of the obligation to 
communicate awards at arbitration and recommendations to it.  
 
5.2 Technical agreements in Article 2, Regulation 4056/86  
 
The repeal of the conference block exemption seems unsurprising given the weight of 
academic criticism against the regime. Even less surprising is the repeal, in particular, of 
Article 2 of that regulation. It is rare to find provisions such as Article 2 in legislation of the 
importance of Regulation 4056/86 for the reason that it has been correctly described as 
‘merely declaratory’.64 In being so, it failed to clarify the position of ship owners and has 
been accused of causing a good deal of confusion.  
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5.2.1 The legal quality of the exception for technical agreements 
 
The origins of the Article are found in Article 3 of Regulation 1017/68.65 The spirit of the 
latter article is maintained throughout Article 2, Regulation 4056/86. Its purpose was to 
except technical agreements in Community rail, road and inland waterway transport from 
the applicability of EC competition law. The exact meaning of Article 3, Regulation 
1017/68 was found to be in doubt following the French Seamen case, discussed above. 
With the applicability of article 81 EC to areas regulated by the Treaty previously argued to 
be outside its scope, an exception contained in a piece of secondary legislation could not 
attain its purpose – Article 81(1) EC was applicable and only ceased to be so if Article 
81(3) EC was satisfied.  
 
Article 3 of Regulation 1017/68 therefore came to be interpreted as a declaration of 
agreements that are not, by their nature, restrictive of competition. Reading Regulation 
4056/86, in force twelve years after the French Seamen case, this is certainly hinted at in 
the text and the same conclusion, that it is not an exemption from Article 81(1) EC, can be 
drawn regarding Article 2 thereof. The seventh recital of the 1986 regulation states that the 
exclusion of technical agreements from the Treaty prohibition is granted because such 
agreements do not restrict competition. One could question the necessity of stating that 
collaboration that does not restrict competition is exempt from the prohibition of 
competitively restrictive collaboration.66  
 
 
5.2.2 Justifications for Article 2, Regulation 4056/86  
 
That said, the inclusion of the provision could be justified on the grounds of certainty. 
Stating explicitly the types of agreements that are in mind throughout the liner conference 
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block exemption could be wise. Such an approach could set clear boundaries and allows 
ship owners and liner shipping companies the opportunity to see what they can do under 
the legislation. Support for this view might be the fact that Regulation 1/2003 was not to 
emerge for another seventeen years.  
 
Regulation 1/2003, allowing as it does for the direct applicability of the EC competition 
rules and Article 81(3) in particular, ended the need for the Commission to consider the 
permissibility of many minor competitive infringements. Prior to this, undertakings 
uncertain of the status of their agreements under Article 81 EC would have to approach the 
Commission. Self assessment and ‘compliance until told otherwise’ was not available in 
1986. So it could be submitted that the seemingly exorbitant Article 2, Regulation 4056/86 
was a necessary time-saving device instigated by the Council on behalf of the Commission.  
 
A final comment on the character of the exclusion of technical agreements turns on the 
wording of the article itself. Such agreements, it is stated, are permissible provided that it is 
their “…sole object and effect to achieve technical improvements or cooperation…”67 This 
seems to be a reminder that liner shipping companies complying with the block 
exemption’s requirements, can make technical agreements provided that is all they are – 
technical. In furtherance of the need to state this in the legislation is the content of the 
article itself, which at times looks suspiciously anti-competitive in its effects, if not objects. 
Explicit guidance in such a manner reinforces the seventh recital’s point that in mind here 
are agreements that do not generally restrict competition.  
 
Speaking generally, competition law is often a Delphic topic. To ship owners not versed in 
the law it must seem incomprehensible that agreements, even those that are not really 
agreements but coordinated market behaviour or other tacit collusion, can give rise to large 
fines. Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86 did not help matters in this regard. It looked on its 
surface to be an exemption from competition law when in fact it is not. It also looked on its 
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surface to be a list of agreements that are permissible under EC law. In fact it is not.68 For 
this reason, in spite of the possible justifications above, the provision did not clarify the law 
or create legal certainty for liner shipping companies.69 As much the Commission has 
admitted itself.70 Commentators have instead cited it as a weakness in the liner conference 
block exemption.71  
 
5.2.3 Other elements in the application of Article 2, Regulation 4056/86  
 
Having established that Article 2 was ‘merely declaratory’ whilst the agreements listed 
therein were potentially restrictive of competition, one could question whether it was wise 
to attempt to use the exception for technical agreements at all without knowing what 
further considerations under the Article, perhaps not stated therein, it was advisable to 
comply with. The answer to this problem is important in assessing under which conditions 
the spirit of Article 2, regulation 4056/86 lives on after Regulation 1419/2006. In 
determining this it will be possible to see what guidance can be drawn from the now-
repealed provision on technical agreements.  
 
As an example of such ‘further considerations’ we could take an agreement between firms 
that do not actually or potentially compete. Agreements between firms operating in 
different markets are not caught by the prohibition contained in Article 81(1) EC.72 It 
follows that agreements that would have fallen under Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86, even 
if they contained some commercial element, would not be prohibited under the Treaty.73 
Regardless of Article 2, such agreements are not a competitive concern. With this in mind 
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the provision simply looks like a useful list of examples of technical agreements that non-
competing firms could make.  
 
The logic of this example could equally be applied to any agreement that falls outside 
Article 81(1) EC, for whatever reason. But, for other undertakings such as actual or 
potential competitors, agreements in the areas listed in Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86 that 
are not purely technical should be flagged-up as more likely than not to fall foul of Article 
81(1) EC. It will then be for the undertakings involved to apply for an individual exemption 
under 81(3) EC. This process will become clearer below, under the discussion of the 
Treaty.  
 
5.2.4 Summary   
 
Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86 was declaratory while that regulation was in force. Upon 
repeal of the provision without a transitional period, the legal effects are minimal. After all, 
Article 2 contained examples of agreements that were not meant to be restrictive of 
competition in the first place. Now, the main reference for a liner shipping company 
seeking legal clarity will be Article 81 EC. Avoiding Article 81(1) EC or complying with 
81(3) EC will mean that there will be no competition problems. For example, if the 
agreement under consideration is truly technical or is not between actual or potential 
competitors, the analysis would not even get as far as individual exemptions because 81(1) 
EC would not be applicable. In this light Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86 is nothing more 
than what it was before being repealed – a useful list of agreements in the technical sphere. 
Perhaps now it is gone, this provision will not be relied upon by liner shipping companies 
as it was in the FETTSCA case, to their bemused detriment. It is possible that it could be 
put to more effective use.  
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5.3 The liner consortia block exemption  
 
The consortia block exemption comes from the Commission on authority from the Council 
through Regulation 479/92. The Commission being a less political institution within the 
Union and consortia being less controversial than their price-fixing counterpart of liner 
conferences, there has not been so much heated debate surrounding the block exemption 
originally contained in Commission Regulation 870/95. Indeed, that regulation has been 
only marginally amended in twelve years, and looks, following its second ‘renewal’ in 
2005, to be set to stay as a feature of Community regulation in the maritime sector.  
 
The consortia block exemption’s substantive provisions are contained in Regulation 
823/2000, as amended by Regulations 611/2005 and, earlier, 463/2004. Having set down 
the basics of liner consortia above in ‘The liner shipping industry’74, the substantive 
provisions of Regulation 823/2000 will be discussed here by first detailing the Regulation’s 
scope. The substantive provisions of the block exemption will be outlined before going on 
to discuss what effects, if any, the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 has had on liner consortia.  
 
5.3.1 The scope of the liner consortia block exemption  
 
The application of Regulation 823/2000 depends on four main criteria. Broadly speaking, 
these four may be grouped into two categories of ‘territorial’ and ‘personal’. In addition, 
one could establish a third category by pointing to the temporal aspect of the block 
exemption as, unlike Regulation 4056/86, consortia have a limited life span of five years 
from the start of the exemption. Article 1 of Regulation 4056/86, entitled ‘Scope’, details 
these two main categories.  
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5.3.2 Personal scope of Regulation 823/2000  
 
In terms of the legislation’s personal scope, the relevant terms are ‘consortia’ and ‘liner 
transport services’. These concepts are defined in the following provision, Article 2, in 
paragraphs one and two respectively. These definitions reveal an overlap as the definition 
of consortium, broad almost to an extreme75, includes the phrase “…vessel-operating 
carriers which provide international liner shipping services…” It could therefore be said 
that a consortium by its very nature offers liner transport services. But the definition in 
Article 2 refers not to the consortia themselves but rather the liner-members thereof – 
“vessel-operating carriers which provide liner transport services”.  
 
Thus, to be a member of a consortium the undertaking must offer liner transport services. 
The benefit of the block exemption, under Article 1, applies “only in so far as” the 
consortium itself offers liner transport services. This is the personal scope of the block 
exemption – groups of liner shipping companies offering liner shipping services. Such 
services are defined, as stated, in Article 2, paragraph two of regulation 823/2000. The 
relevance of that definition crucially prevents tramp shipping services and the transport of 
passengers benefiting from the block exemption.  
 
It has already been indicated that membership of a conference and a consortium 
contemporaneously is a possibility.76 However so-called ‘tolerated outsider’ agreements are 
not a possibility.77 By these are meant agreements between consortia and between consortia 
and other liner shipping companies. This is perhaps to ensure competition outside the 
consortia involved, and perhaps to make consortia the framework agreement of choice for 
liner shipping companies.78  
 
                                                 
75 Dinger, p. 128  
76 Recital 8, Commission Regulation 823/2000; Articles 5 and 6 thereof are also evidence of this  
77 Recital 21, Commission Regulation 823/2000  
78 Dinger, p. 103  
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5.3.3 Territorial scope of Regulation 823/2000  
 
In considering the territorial scope of the block exemption the noteworthy phrases from 
Article 1 are ‘international’ and ‘from or to one or more Community ports’. To my mind 
the interpretation of ‘international’ is straight forward. Goods that go from one country to 
another country have been transported internationally. This is not the same as merely 
crossing an international boundary during a journey. Because there are many independent 
nations within the European Community, even transport between those states is 
international and thus falls under the liner consortia block exemption from EC competition 
law. Cabotage, transport within one state, is thus not included, although part of a journey 
within a country could constitute part of an international transport of goods should so long 
as the goods are not being loaded and discharged in the same state. An example of this 
might be taking goods along the River Rhine before taking the vessel out to sea and on to, 
say, France.  
 
That is the general position. The extent to which multimodal transport is covered by the 
Regulation will be discussed below under the assimilation of the law with the agreements 
made by liner shipping companies inter se.  
 
‘From or to one or more Community ports’ presents a different problem regarding 
interpretation. Community ports do need to be defined. However the remainder of the quote 
has two parts that can be split-up and discussed separately. The same two parts – ‘from or 
to’ and ‘one or more’ also appear in the liner conference block exemption, Regulation 
4056/86. Reference to that Regulation’s interpretation may therefore offer some guidance 
here.   
 
Firstly, the block exemption applies ‘from or to’ the Community. Consortia, therefore, 
benefit from the block exemption on all journeys beginning in and ending in the 
Community. This is advantageous to both importers and exporters who benefit from lower 
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rates. It clearly excludes non-Community transport. To all of the carriers in the 
Community, this could be termed cross-trading outside the European Community.79  
 
The second part, ‘one or more’ is included to clarify the position of the block exemption 
towards consortia operating extensive logistics networks across the Community. Operating 
out of several ports does not prevent the block exemption applying. This echoes the 
position described above, that liner shipping in consortia operating between member states 
maintains the block exemption benefit. It also expands the point made in the preceding 
paragraph that the regulation covers journeys beginning and ending in the Community – it 
also covers the journeys forward from those ports and within the community that satisfy the 
requirement that that transport is international.  
 
5.3.4 Main features of the consortia block exemption  
 
After the provisions related to scope and definitions in Regulation 823/2000 comes the 
exemption itself and the conditions related to it. They are built upon the broad brush 
strokes of Article 81(3) EC. The exemption is in the form of an exhaustive list of 
agreements that liner consortia members may make between themselves in letters (a) to (g).  
 
Some of the daily operations of liner shipping consortia appear in the list in Article 3(2)(a) 
of Regulation 823/2000. The use of the word “solely” at the start of this provision indicates 
a restriction on liner shipping companies. If a consortium agreement is to make use of the 
block exemption, agreements on its day to day joint operation are restricted to the list 
therein. Letters (b) to (f) contain other arrangements that might form a liner consortium 
agreement. Notable amongst these are temporary capacity management programmes in 
letter (b) and the possibility of forming cargo and revenue pools in letter (d). Consortia may 
                                                 
79 Whether or not this position could be affected by the doctrine of effects is doubtable. On that doctrine 
under Article 81 EC, see Whish, p. 106 et seq.  
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also operate port terminals jointly (letter (c)), vote in conferences as a block (letter (e)), 
operate joint marketing structures and issue joint bills of lading (letter f)).  
 
Lastly, via letter (g) of Article 3(2), any agreements necessary for achieving the agreements 
in the preceding six letters are permissible. In this regard, two specific examples are 
mentioned in Article 3(3). Thereby, consortia might agree that extra tonnage requirements 
may only be chartered in from amongst the member lines unless clearance is granted to 
agree otherwise. Tonnage might also be chartered out with the express agreement of a 
consortium itself.  
 
The exemption is built upon by Article 4 with regard to capacity management programmes. 
Thereby, no percentage reductions of capacity may be adopted. The consequence of this is 
that if capacity is to be reduced, this may only be done by a reduction of vessel numbers or 
the number of sailings. Recital seven of the regulation seems to put this down to 
proportionality – only allowing that which is necessary to achieve an agreement’s ends. It 
states that capacity management by percentage “is not an essential feature of consortia.” 
However, some commentators have explained this provision, with great supporting 
evidence from the Commission, by citing consistency with the approach taken towards 
Regulation 4056/86. This inconsistency, particularly in light of the repeal of Regulation 
4056/86, indicates the need for further discussion of this topic. This is done through the 
final part of this work.  
 
Article 5 of Regulation 823/2000 closely reflects part of Article 81(3) EC, which will be 
discussed below. Liner consortia are permitted to operate on a market, provided there is 
effective competition. The purpose of this is to prevent a consortium becoming the only 
player on a given market, acting effectively as a monopoly. For consortia within 
conferences there must be competition, within the conference, on either price or the quality 
of services offered. Consortia outside conferences must be subject to actual or potential 
competition from outside lines.   
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Maintaining this effective competition pursuant to Article 81(3) EC are two further 
provisions. Firstly, it is only through the consortia structure that the benefits of the block 
exemption may be obtained. That is to say, no outsiders can make agreements with 
consortia or their members and thereby avoid Article 81(1) EC.80 Secondly, Article six 
limits the benefit of the block exemption to consortia with market shares under a certain 
amount.  
 
Articles 8 and 9 of Regulation 823/2000 set down conditions and obligations that are 
somewhat more procedural in their nature.81 These include the rights to withdraw from a 
consortium, to market independently and holding consultations between shippers and 
consortia. Service arrangements, commonly known as individual service contracts, are 
permitted through Article 8(a) and the principle of non-discrimination, pursuant to recital 
13, is contained in Article 8(d).  
 
The last aspect of relevance from Regulation 823/2000 is Article 10. This allows for 
agreements to be made between transport users and consortia so long as they are adopted 
through the consultation process provided for through Article 9 and concern the conditions 
and quality of liner shipping services.  
 
 
5.3.5 A note on alliances  
 
Alliances are not regulated under EC competition law. They are sometimes formed through 
the use of the consortia block exemption, though often they utilise far more complex 
structures. There is consensus amongst many academics that ‘global strategic alliances’ do 
                                                 
80 This objective, set out in recital 21 of the regulation, is achieved through the definition of consortia and the 
absence of any provisions regarding ‘outsider’ lines.  
81 Article 7 was deleted by Regulation 463/2004 and is discussed here  
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not create any competition law problems. In this light, it seems unlikely that any regime 
will be forthcoming.82  
 
5.3.6 Summary  
 
Regulation 823/2000 is a clear piece of legislation. It looks to achieve a workable block 
exemption with the use of checks and balances. These aim to ensure that the regulation’s 
base83 in the Treaty, Article 81(3) EC, is abided by. The Treaty will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
Consortia have not been affected a great deal by the repeal of the conference block 
exemption. This is helped in part by Regulation 1/2003, which did much to clear the way 
for Regulation 1419/2006. An example is the repeal in 2003 of Article 12, Regulation 
4056/86. Consortia looking for individual exemptions under Article 81(3) EC no longer 
had to look to Article 12, Regulation 4056/86. The effect of the repeal of that regulation 
was therefore already greatly diminished, even as the Community institutions began to 
discuss the viability of liner conferences.84  
 
As indicated, the next section will set out briefly the source of EC Competition law 
regarding agreements between liner shipping companies, Article 81 EC. Following that, 
some of the already established agreements that lines would like to make between 
themselves are analysed in light of the EC liner shipping regime.  
 
 
                                                 
82 OECD Report, pp. 37 & 55-56; see also Kreis, ‘Liner Services: The Block exemption and Inter-modal 
Transport’, from Bull and Stemshaug, ‘EC Shipping policy’, (1996), p. 129  
83 By this is meant the regulation’s inspiration – not the legal provision that allows the Council and 
Commission to pass such block exemptions.  
84 A discussion of the end of the notifications for individual exemptions is found in Whish, p. 164  
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5.4 Article 81 EC  
 
5.4.1 Introduction  
 
In the first section of Title VI to the Treaty of the European Community appear several 
articles forming the body of law commonly known as EC competition law. The focus here 
is on Article 81 EC.   
 
EC competition law was intended to be one means of counteracting divisions within the 
Community. That intention remains strongly reflected in case law and Commission 
decisions.85 Article 81 EC is designed to catch any collaborative arrangements, whether 
explicit or not, that at least aim to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the 
common market. There must be an effect on trade between member states. The list of 
agreements, (a) to (e), are considered to be competitively restrictive as a rule. Agreements 
within this general ambit are void with direct effect. Certain conduct may be exempted 
from the prohibition through Article 81(3) EC because of the benefits it produces.  
 
5.4.2 “Undertakings” within Article 81(1) EC  
 
Loosely, undertakings under EC competition law include ‘every entity engaged in an 
economic activity regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is 
financed’.86 Although liner shipping companies undoubtedly fall within this definition, two 
further points remain that can alter the basic position.87 Some discussion has revolved 
around the status of two or more companies actually being one ‘undertaking. It seems that 
undertakings forming one single economic entity are to be considered as such within 
competition law – agreements, for example, between parent and subsidiary companies, 
                                                 
85 This is particularly true when considering unilateral actions by undertakings  
86 Per the ECJ in Hoefner and Elsner v Macrotron GmbH, Case C – 41/90 [1991] ECR I-1979  
87 See Whish p. 80, Jones and Sufrin p. 107 and Furse p. 21-24  
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therefore lack the necessary collaborative element required for Article 81 EC to apply. 
Another talking point has been undertakings related by succession. Such undertakings may 
inherit the competition law liabilities of their predecessors.88  
 
5.4.3 Agreements, decisions, concerted practices and categories thereof  
 
Article 81(1) EC has been drafted to be as broad as possible. So it is not just explicit 
agreements that come within its scope. Undertakings may have formed themselves into 
groups or associations. Decisions by such associations may have a harmful effect on 
competition between its members. Equally, concerted practices, the most subtle form of 
collaboration in EC Competition law, could harm competition by affecting the manner in 
which independent undertakings behave on a given market in relation to one another. Thus 
it is not only collaboration that is legally enforceable that is under consideration. The 
secrecy involved in breaches of competition law often leads to evidential problems for the 
Commission and Community Courts. A wide approach no doubt helps to mitigate these 
problems.   
 
An agreement is a broad concept under EC competition law. Gentlemen’s agreements and 
oral understandings fall within its scope.  Parties to negotiation may also be found to have 
made agreements, even where it is only one of the parties that has revealed its intentions. 
The more complex agreements become, the more likely it is that they are written down. 
This heightened complexity is not solved by the existence of written agreements and it has 
brought several new problems to the enforcement of Article 81 EC. Over time, complex 
agreements may vary, both in their terms and their membership. In response to this, the 
authorities have determined that there is no need to distinguish between categories of 
agreements and concerted practices, although they remain separate conceptually. It has also 
been declared that single, overall agreements count for the purposes of Article 81 EC. This 
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is in spite of there actually being a complex network of agreements that have changed over 
time. Undertakings with only periphery involvement in the agreement may still be liable.  
 
The second category of prohibited arrangements is ‘decisions by associations of 
undertakings’. Associations are usually formed when larger numbers of participants take 
part in the prohibited activity. The category is actually entitled in a misleadingly narrow 
way as ‘decisions’ might include agreements made by the association, recommendations to 
its members (including non-binding recommendations) and even the association’s 
constitution. Associations may sometimes behave as an association and at other time, for 
example, as a servant of government. The effects on competition of associations of 
associations are considered under this heading.  
 
The final category of competitively restrictive collaboration is concerted practices. These 
have been described as loose arrangements, not qualifying as agreements within Article 
81(1) EC. Through the case law of the ECJ, upholding the decisions of the Commission, it 
could be said that concerted practices involve direct or indirect mental consensus between 
undertakings to behave in a certain way. Further, there must be some form of reciprocity, 
as the term ‘consensus’ implies. A concerted practice does not, by definition, require there 
to have been effects on the market. There is a presumption that the conduct putting into 
effect the contents of the mental consensus will follow.  
 
Concerted practices present a special difficulty for competition authorities. This is because 
certain conditions may lead to market behaviour that looks similar to a concerted practice. 
Oligopolistic markets, dominated by only a few firms, may lead firms to making similar 
decisions at similar times. This is perhaps why the ECJ has insisted that, where the 
evidence submitted by the Commission is circumstantial, the presence of any other 
explanation for the conduct in question will result in the setting aside of the Commission’s 
decision. This, a rather more economic aspect of competition law, is mentioned later with 
regard to liner shipping companies.  
 
 PP
5.4.4 The object or effect of the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition  
 
Article 81(1) EC has as its focus only those arrangements that aim to be, or are, 
significantly harmful, directly or indirectly, to actual or potential competition. Many 
commentators do not attempt to define “prevention”, “restriction” or “distortion”. Rather, 
their characteristics are displayed through case examples. Often a distinction is not drawn 
between the three adverse effects on competition. “Restriction” is used as a blanket term. In 
this work, there is not enough space to list examples of the types of arrangements in mind. I 
have therefore taken the more important aspects of this part of Article 81 EC, to display the 
provision’s application. This section also adopts the phrase ‘restriction’ as the focus of the 
provision.  
 
Article 81 EC has clearly been drafted in the broadest possible manner. Within its scope 
fall arrangements that have as their ‘object or effect’ the restriction of competition. These 
two concepts should be considered separately. They are “alternative, not cumulative 
requirements”.89 If the arrangement has a competitively harmful object, there is no need to 
look at its effects. There are not many such arrangements whose objects are considered to 
be per se restrictive of competition. Examples include price fixing and market sharing, as 
noted in Article 81(1) EC itself. Falling within this category does not exclude the 
possibility of individual exemption under Article 81(3) EC. If it cannot be said that the 
object of the agreement, decision or concerted practice is to restrict competition, its effect 
must be examined. This requires an economic analysis of the arrangements under 
consideration and the undertakings involved.90  
 
Restrictive agreements, decisions and concerted practices include not just those between 
undertakings at the same level of the market, such as ‘suppliers’ or ‘retailers’. These are 
known as horizontal arrangements. Vertical arrangements occur between undertakings 
operating at different levels of the market and, controversially, have been brought within 
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the scope of the Community’s competition provisions.91 Parents and subsidiaries 
sometimes fall to be considered here, as do suppliers and distributors. For both horizontal 
and vertical arrangements, there are block exemptions for certain categories and detailed 
guidelines issued by the Commission.  
 
The Commission’s approach to restriction of competition has been much criticised for 
being too formalistic and lacking a sufficient grasp of the underlying economic factors. 
There can be no doubt that it has positively reacted to this criticism and has adopted a more 
‘realistic’ approach. Worthy of mention regarding the Commission’s general approach is 
also the broadening of the block exemptions, particularly for vertical arrangements, for 
economically beneficial activities. Some activities, even without a block or individual 
exemption, are simply necessary in pursuing certain legitimate commercial purposes.92 
Such activities fall outside Article 81(1) EC.  
 
5.4.5 The de minimis doctrine  
 
Economic analyses of arrangements inevitably bring the question of the de minimis 
doctrine into mind.93 Under this doctrine, there must be “an appreciable impact either on 
competition or on inter-state trade” for Article 81 EC to become applicable.94 Significance 
is measured not only in terms of the impact that a restriction has economically. The market 
power of the undertakings involved will also determine whether or not there is a 
competition law concern. Because of the nature of these activities, informal settlements are 
usually made by the Commission. As such, there is not a great deal of case law or 
decisional practice to draw from. A guidance paper in 2001, ‘Commission Notice on 
Agreements of Minor Importance’ sheds light on the matter, however. It should be noted 
that this document is not legally binding.  
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5.4.6 Effect on trade between Member States  
 
“Trade” is construed broadly to include many activities with a commercial character. Sales, 
services, transport and even ‘energy’ are considered here95. This part of Article 81(1) EC 
has been stated to be a jurisdictional issue.96 It follows that the Commission and Courts do 
not have jurisdiction over matters affecting only one Member State.97 Nonetheless, two 
undertakings from the same state, or an arrangement only implemented in one Member 
State, can still feasibly affect trade between Member States. The effect on trade can be 
actual or potential, direct or indirect.98 Thus, the broad scope of Article 81 EC is 
maintained here.99  
 
Exactly how broad the provision is begs an important question – in an increasingly 
globalised world, particularly in the last quarter century, how far will EC law extend to 
activities not occurring in its territory and not involving undertakings established or having 
subsidiaries therein? It is understandably difficult to establish jurisdiction where the 
activity concerned is between two third party countries. Jurisdiction in competition law 
issues is traditionally decided by the economic entity theory100 or the principle of 
territoriality.101 However, the ECJ has refrained from commenting on the potential use of 
the doctrine of effects to expand its use of EC competition law. This is despite the 
Commission and a number of advocates general being openly enthusiastic for its 
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adoption.102 The doctrine of effects allows for the jurisdiction of a court to be established 
where the activity concerned has an impact that is prohibited within its borders.103   
 
This issue is of pertinence to the liner shipping industry. Territoriality and economic entity 
theories can only be useful to the Community courts up to a point. I disagree that it is 
unlikely that the doctrine of effects will come to be used.104 Europe has countries on its 
doorstep, such as Morocco, Russia and Turkey, through which goods are taken into the 
Union. Price fixing, for example, on routes to these countries from third parties, and 
subsequent transport to Member States, could potentially do harm to the Community. 
However, this conduct is caught only by the doctrine of effects. Without a doubt, controls 
and measures would have to be included in any adoption of such a practice, lest the long 
arm of Community competition policy begin to look uncomfortably American. In my 
opinion there has to be some room for the doctrine of effects within EC competition law, 
taking into account the political implications of such a step. For now, no such stance has 
been taken and the doctrine is firmly outside the law. Perhaps Kreis sums up the position 
best while discussing potential conflict of laws: “Although the Commission’s jurisdiction 
to apply its competition laws is governed by the territoriality principle it cannot entirely 
stop at the EU water’s edge…”105  
 
5.4.7 Article 81(2) EC  
 
Arrangements falling within Article 81(1) EC, as well as possibly attracting a fine, are void 
without any further decision being required, by virtue of Article 81(2) EC. The agreement, 
decision or concerted practice is simply void, unless it falls within Article 81(3) EC, to be 
discussed below. This takes effect from the date of conclusion of the agreement or on the 
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coming into effect of Article 81(1) EC, whichever occurred latest.106 The arrangement is 
void in its entirety only if the offending clauses or sections cannot be removed from the 
arrangement without removing the essence of the arrangement.107  In national courts, 
severability is to be decided according to the customary national rules.108  
 
5.4.8 Article 81(3) EC  
 
The last part of Article 81 EC contains the legal exception to the prohibition. As a 
preliminary note of interest, this exception is now directly applicable. From 1st May 2004 
undertakings were able to assess their own agreements for compliance with Article 81(3) 
EC. If questioned, the burden of proof lies on that undertaking to show that it has complied 
with the four requirements of the exception. As well as easing the workload of the 
Commission, this change has necessitated clear guidance to aid in undertakings’ self 
assessments. The Commission issued guidelines on this area of the law, but firms may also 
draw on guidance from block exemption granted under the framework109 of Article 81(3) 
EC and case law from the Commission and Community Courts.  
 
Article 81(3) EC is an interesting arm of Community competition law in that it provides a 
broad margin of flexibility to the Commission, Courts and National Competition 
Authorities to decide where the limits of competition law lie. The fact that, as Whish 
emphasises110, all agreements, regardless of their terms, are in theory capable of fulfilling 
the requirements of Article 81(3) EC, demonstrates the importance of this flexibility. The 
extent to which legal certainty and predictability are sacrificed is open to debate. Despite 
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being exempted from Article 81(1) EC, arrangements satisfying Article 81(3) EC remain 
subject to Article 82 EC regarding abuses of dominant positions.111  
 
There are four criteria for the satisfaction of Article 81(3) EC. They are cumulative and 
exhaustive.112 If one is not fulfilled, there can be no legal exception through the provision. 
Each criterion is laid out below.  
 
5.4.8.1 Gains in efficiency  
 
The Treaty does not use the words ‘gains in efficiency’ but this is broadly what it is 
referring to. It is helpful to look as widely as possible at the phrase “which contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress”. Commentators note that there is a tendency by the institutions to interpret 
Article 81(3) EC as broadly as possible. Considerations look towards the greater aims of 
the Community – economic integration and the common market, the four freedoms, social 
aims and even environmental policy. Suffice it to say, whatever the gains, they must be 
demonstrable and a clear link to the arrangement should be apparent.  
 
5.4.8.2 A fair share of the benefits should go to consumers  
 
The benefits that gains in efficiency produce are, as could be inferred from the diversity in 
the types of gains in mind, not just cheaper goods or services. Greater regularity of services 
is a benefit, as is choice or an increase in the volumes available113. Indeed in the Reims II 
judgment, even a form of price fixing was held to improve the intra-Community postal 
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system.114 Sometimes, commentators have stated, a benefit can be presumed where the 
market is a competitive one.115  
 
It is “consumers” to whom these benefits must be passed. A consumer is any person, legal 
or natural, acquiring goods in the course of trade.116 As such, it is not necessarily the public 
that should be able to take advantage of lower prices or greater stability and regularity of 
services. The last part of this criterion, the “fair share”, affords flexibility to the 
Community institutions as it has not been defined.117 Suffice it to say that it will usually be 
apparent when the competitive restrictions of an agreement outweigh the benefits felt lower 
down the economic chain.  
 
5.4.8.3 The arrangement must not contain any dispensable restrictions to 
competition  
 
This arm of Article 81(3) EC is a manifestation of the principle of proportionality. If there 
is going to be an exception from the prohibition, the exception will only allow what is 
necessary. Whish points to the block exemptions for examples of what sort of elements are 
considered unnecessary.118 It seems clear to me that a restrictive element, so long as it can 
be objectively justified on strong economic or commercial grounds, will be allowed. For 
example, high charges for a service could be justified, as they were in the Visa 
International case.119 Exclusivity might be considered indispensable despite its clear impact 
on competition, particularly in matters concerning intellectual property or distribution 
agreements.  
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5.4.8.4 The elimination of competition  
 
The last element of Article 81(3) EC is a negative requirement. Undertakings should not be 
allowed to eliminate competition for a substantial part of the products in question. This 
being the last of four cumulative criteria, commentators have noted that the elimination of 
competition is sometimes the neglected head under Article 81(3) EC. Large undertakings 
will inevitably find it more difficult to avoid eliminating competition than their smaller 
rivals as their market shares are presumably larger. Nonetheless, there is a suggestion that 
the Community authorities have been lenient in this respect, to keep the Community 
competitive ‘abroad’. Because of the economic analysis here, the relevant market must be 
defined.  In doing so, actual and potential competition must be considered. Allowing 
market access to potential competitors is therefore of importance.  
 
5.4.8.5 Summary  
 
Article 81 EC is as broad a provision as one will find amongst competition regimes. It 
allows for most forms of economic collaboration to fall within its ambit, and declares those 
that restrict competition void with direct effect of Article 81(2) EC. The Commission’s 
approach has focused more on the economic realities of competitively restrictive 
arrangements in recent years and Its work load has been lightened by the ‘Modernisation 
Regulation’ in 2003. The ECJ and CFI continue to be the sole interpreters of the Treaty.  
 
Avoiding the prohibition has undergone considerable change as a result of Regulation 
1/2003, Article 81(3) EC now being directly applicable. The Commission has retained the 
right to rule on novel cases but national competition authorities are greatly empowered 
under the new regime. Block exemptions remain unchanged for undertakings within their 
scope.  
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Liner shipping as an industry will need to be fully aware of Article 81 EC’s terms. In light 
of the direct applicability of the individual legal exception, lines are afforded great freedom 
to make agreements and act in concert where they might be restricting competition. This is 
so long as they assess their actions correctly under the legal exception. Of course lines may 
also satisfy the criteria for the most important block exemption in liner shipping, that for 
liner consortia. 
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6 CATEGORIES OF LINER SHIPPING AGREEMENTS UNDER EC 
COMPETITION LAW  
 
In the previous chapters the agreements that will be taken as examples for agreements in 
different areas of liner shipping have been laid out, as have the most relevant legal 
provisions. This chapter aims to assimilate that information. The purpose is to place the 
legal frameworks around the agreements to establish what arrangements might be reached 
between liner carriers in the four areas of potential agreement – port, deep-sea, cargo and 
‘other’. In each area finding the legal limits on those agreements and outlining the main 
caveats for liner shipping undertakings will be a priority. Because of the limits placed on 
this paper, noted above, the four main areas are looked at through examples. It is to be 
stressed again that this is not an economics paper. As such, economic analyses of 
undertakings’ agreements would be out of place here.  
 
6.1 Technical agreements; Article 2, Regulation 4056/86 and vessel type 
agreements  
 
It has been established that the effects of the repeal of Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86 are 
minimal. The Article was declaratory. The agreements contained therein were not 
restrictive to competition according to the conference block exemption’s recitals.120 Its 
repeal was eased by the so called ‘Modernisation Regulation’; Regulation 1/2003, from its 
coming into force, ensured the direct applicability of Article 81(3) EC.121 This meant that 
undertakings were no longer required to notify the Commission of agreements that could 
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restrict competition but might be exempted.122 The agreements in Article 2 of Regulation 
4056/86, although prima facie not restrictive of competition, would have had to be notified 
to the Commission in numerous cases. Their inclusion in a block exemption saved the 
Commission’s time in making legal exceptions for such agreements individually.  
 
Under the conference system, members could agree that only certain types or standards of 
vessel were to be used.123 Agreements on vessel types ensure that all of the undertakings 
involved can operate a streamlined service. The vessels would all be capable of calling at 
the same ports, perhaps where cargo lifting equipment needs to be on board the vessel 
because port the facilities are lacking in that respect. The vessels, chiefly container vessels 
within any consortia operation, could all carry the same cargo. Logistically this makes life 
a great deal easier for liner shipping companies. And if that is so, life is usually easier for 
shippers. Within a consortium it is understandable that vessel type agreements might be 
made. It is highly unlikely that such an agreement might be made in isolation. This type of 
agreement is ancillary, one could say, to other arrangements.  
 
Article 2 of Regulation 4056/86 having now been repealed, lines in a consortium could 
look elsewhere for legal certainty. The primary block exemption from competition law for 
liner shipping – the consortia block exemption – provides a possibility for vessel type 
agreements, albeit without stating so explicitly. Under Article 3(2)(g) of Regulation 
823/2000 activities that are ancillary and necessary to agreements in the other exempted 
areas are allowed. An example of where vessel type agreements might be ancillary could be 
the pooling of vessels under Article 3(2)(a)(iii). It would seem sensible to have a common 
type of vessel in the pool to ease logistics. Equally, under a cargo pool a consortium would 
require vessels that are capable of sharing the cargo. Of course, it could be difficult to 
argue for the necessity of an agreement but one could ask if lines even need to look to a 
block exemption. Vessel type agreements have come from Article 2, Regulation 4056/86. 
As such these are technical agreements and therefore prima facie not restrictive of 
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competition. It could be that the only advantage of a justification under the block 
exemption rather than self assessment under Article 81 of the Treaty is legal certainty. The 
same could be said for technical agreements generally.124  
 
6.2 Deep sea/vessel agreements; capacity management programmes  
 
Capacity management programmes are perhaps most exemplary of the liner shipping 
industry’s manipulation of its key assets - vessels - to suit market conditions. Capacity 
management, as hinted at above, involves the restriction of space on vessels by a group of 
carriers. Their hope will be to bring about greater ratios of demand: supply, justifying 
higher prices than those that a wholly competitive market would dictate.  
 
The rationale for this action by lines is, at its most fundamental, to ensure the stability of 
prices and thus profits. The necessity for this arises because of seasonal fluctuations and 
temporary directional differences in demand on any given route. In using capacity 
management, lines create supra-competitive rates; a competition law issue is abundantly 
clear. In the wording of Article 81(1) EC, capacity management programmes have ‘the 
object or effect’ of restricting competition. In actual fact such collaboration aims to and 
does affect competition.  
 
The legal response of the Community has been through two block exemptions – those for 
conferences and consortia. Details of the responses differ in form but the effect is the same. 
Under both regimes, the Community allowed capacity management programmes but 
required that no percentage adjustments are made – only reductions in sailings or vessel 
numbers were adequate. The conference system, after much debate, was restricted in this 
respect by case law.125 The block exemption for consortia, the Commission having learned 
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its lesson, contained such terms from the outset.126 In addition, consortia capacity 
adjustments had to be temporary in nature.  
 
6.2.1 Percentage adjustments of vessel capacity  
 
It has been stated that the exclusion of percentage changes from the scope of the consortia 
block exemption from the outset was to keep uniformity with the counterpart exemption for 
conferences.127 This, it was said, would prevent conferences from making percentage 
adjustment agreements under their ‘consortia arms’. However the conference block 
exemption is now repealed, albeit in a transitional stage. The question then arises as to 
whether the consortia block exemption should still exclude percentage capacity 
adjustments to prevent abuses from a regime that is no longer relevant.  
 
Consortia on the whole aim to pursue technical and other activities, often unrestrictive of 
competition, in operating liner services. They do not fix prices. Given the fact that price 
fixing combined with restriction of supply, such as capacity management, has been said to 
be possibly the most effective way to restrict competition128, it could be argued that 
consortia are not to be considered in the same breath as conferences, much less to take the 
lead from the conference legal regime. A consortium’s capacity management is 
considerably less restrictive than the actions legally sanctioned for conferences under 
Regulation 4056/86. It could secondly be argued that percentage adjustments allow for a 
more precise industry reaction to seasonal and economic fluctuations.  
 
For the first argument, that capacity management programmes through consortia are, by 
comparison to the now redundant provisions for liner conferences, far less restrictive of 
competition, it can be added that change cannot be justified because greater detrimental 
impacts to competition were felt under a different regime. Percentage capacity adjustments 
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cannot be allowed simply because price fixing is not. Furthermore, the consortia block 
exemption as we recognise it today129 has the added restriction that capacity management 
must be temporary. So in actual fact the legislature has toughened its stance in this area. 
Any positive responses to percentage capacity adjustments under the consortia block 
exemption are unlikely. Such agreements, as the second argument could be said to imply, 
would place a great deal of control, without adequate restrictions, over actions that are 
highly restrictive of competition.  
 
For both of the above arguments, however, the most important answer is fundamental to 
liner shipping economics and underlines the importance of Article 81(3) EC in the granting 
of any block exemption. That is answer is that percentage changes of vessel carrying 
capacity do not produce any savings for the carriers. They still have to run the same vessels 
with similar, if not identical, costs. By contrast reductions in sailings or vessel numbers 
remove costs from liner shipping companies. Therefore, there is at least the possibility that 
transport users could benefit from a saving somewhere, as required by Article 81(3) EC. 
The same could not be true of percentage adjustments.  
 
6.2.2 Capacity management outside consortia  
 
Outside consortia, capacity management agreements between liner shipping companies are, 
as under vessel type arrangements, unlikely. That is unless such an arrangement is 
complimentary to other collaboration. An example might be in alliance structures or other 
joint ventures. There can be no doubt that such agreements or concerted practices would 
fall under Article 81(1) EC. This, of course, presumes that ‘ordinary’ liner shipping 
companies are involved - free from state obligations or other factors that would cause an 
entity to cease being an undertaking under the competition provisions of the Treaty. 
Capacity management, as stated above, aims to and does restrict competition. Liner 
shipping is a predominantly international business. Nonetheless, there must be a 
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demonstrable effect on trade between Member States over and above the requirements of 
the de minimis doctrine.  
 
Article 81(2) EC would therefore make such agreements void from their conclusion unless 
an individual exception could be made via Article 81(3) EC. Capacity management leads to 
no clear gains in efficiency, as required by that provision, as carriers are only really 
pursuing their own profits. But it could be argued that liner shippers, by restricting supply, 
allow for the stability of rates and thus services. The smooth running of services has been 
held to be a benefit sufficient to trigger Article 81(3) EC, as discussed above.130 Lastly, any 
capacity management programmes outside consortia, whilst not having to fulfil the criteria 
imposed on consortia through the block exemption, would have to show that the 
arrangement included only indispensable terms and that these terms did not enable the to 
eliminate competition in relation to a substantial part of the products in question. These two 
requirements will depend on an economic and contractual/contextual analysis of the exact 
agreement or concerted practices in question.  
 
6.2.3 Summary  
 
Within consortia the use of capacity management is allowed provided that certain limits are 
respected. These limits find their contents reflected by the broader terms of Article 81(3) 
EC. This is particularly true of the exclusion of percentage capacity adjustments, which 
ensures that the benefits of savings from not using entire vessels or sailings are passed onto 
consumers.  
 
Outside consortia Article 81(1) EC looks to be generally applicable and, depending on the 
exact circumstances, so is Article 81(3) EC. Thus such arrangements may be exempted 
from Community competition law. This is unsurprising, given that capacity management 
finds itself excluded from Article 81(1) EC through a block exemption based upon Article 
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81(3) EC. This would not be the case, however, for agreements or concerted practices 
involving percentage adjustments of capacity – the benefits of these arrangements are 
unlikely to be passed on to consumers as no actual gains in efficiency are made by the liner 
shipping companies. It seems that the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 has had no effect on the 
Community’s legal approach to capacity management programmes, excepting that towards 
liner conferences. From this discussion it would prove difficult to draw any conclusion 
regarding the field of ‘deep sea’/vessel agreements between liner shipping companies.  
 
6.3 Cargo; individual service contracts  
 
The title ‘cargo agreements’ in amongst liner shipping companies could be representative 
of all agreements in liner shipping – cargo is the focus of the industry. But under this title 
here, the arrangements in mind are those that directly address cargo. Individual service 
contracts do just this and have been chosen as an example of agreements related to cargo. 
The scope for such contracts is so broad that every feasible agreement concerning cargo 
can fall within it. This section concerns individual service contracts as they are made 
between liner shipping companies as groups and transport users.  
 
6.3.1 The Community’s response to individual service contracts  
 
The opening of a good deal of controversy regarding the use of individual service contracts 
came through Regulation 4056/86 and liner conferences. The liner conference block 
exemption contained no mention of individual service contracts in its main derogation from 
Article 81(1) EC, Article 3. However in Article 6 of the same regulation, conferences were 
explicitly allowed to enter into such contracts, offering transport users specially tailored 
transport services in return for certain quantities of goods over certain periods of time. Both 
parties gained predictability.  
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Members of conferences soon began to offer these specially tailored services outside the 
conference structure, and thus outside the conference tariff. Often they would undercut the 
tariff. Conferences responded by restricting the right of their members to make such 
arrangements. The controversy was only settled when the Commission and CFI ruled, in 
two linked cases, that any restrictions on the rights of conference members to enter into 
individual service contracts was invalid.131  
 
So the position under conferences stemmed not only from the block exemption but from 
the decisional practice of the Commission and the case law of the CFI. Conferences 
members could agree amongst themselves to offer specially tailored services to shippers, as 
could their members on an individual basis.  
 
6.3.2 Liner consortia and ‘service arrangements’  
 
This position was maintained in Article 2(3) of Regulation 823/2000. The block exemption 
for consortia explicitly mentions ‘service arrangements’ throughout. At recital 11 the 
ground is laid for such agreements. The substantive provisions appear in the definition at 
Article 2(3) and the condition in Article 8(a) that each consortium allows members the 
opportunity to offer individual services. This explicit use of service arrangements by 
consortia and their members avoids the discussion that arose in relation to liner 
conferences.  
 
6.3.3 Summary  
 
Individual service arrangements perhaps represent the aim of the Treaty competition 
provisions. Undertakings are free to offer services on an independent basis, free of 
restrictions. Where restrictions to competition are necessary or have particular benefits to 
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the economy, the undertakings involved in those restrictions should remain free to operate 
independently if they wish.  
 
Conferences and consortia restrict competition by allowing liner shipping companies to 
operate services together, restrict capacity and, in the case of liner conferences, agree on 
what prices are to be charged for their services. The Community has, regarding 
conferences, attempted to interpret the block exemption as narrowly as possible. In doing 
so they managed to keep liner conferences as close as possible to the building blocks of the 
block exemption, Article 81(3) EC. This was especially important in the face of a 
politicised Council regulation that could realistically be argued to conform to the Treaty.  
 
Both consortia and conferences are obliged to allow for individual members to make 
agreements with transport users and, importantly for this paper, their members are allowed 
to agree with one another that specifically tailored transport services are to be offered. This 
makes for the maintenance of effective competition outside the conference or consortia132, 
while recognising that the economies of scale brought about by those structures, might also 
be attractive to transport users.  
 
6.4 ‘Other agreements’; revenue pooling  
 
Revenue pooling in liner shipping represents a greater integration between undertakings in 
the liner sector. Taking the revenue of all the member undertakings and distributing that on 
a pre-defined set of rules makes for a severe restriction of competition. But it also makes 
for logistical ease. A line can carry any type of cargo on any of the routes it serves and still 
be able to easily predict its revenue. Lines are therefore less concerned, in any collaborative 
arrangement that involves revenue pooling, with securing the easiest or most profitable 
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cargoes. Members of a revenue pool can also use that status to boost their purchasing 
power and perhaps bargaining position, collectively and individually.  
 
Liner conferences included the opportunity for revenue pools but, that regime having just 
one year left and without the possibility of new conference members, the focus here will be 
on consortia. Through Article 3(2)(d) of Regulation 823/2000 the Treaty competition rules 
are not applicable to ‘the participation in one or more of the following pools: cargo, 
revenue or net revenue”. There can be no doubting the need for a block exemption if these 
sorts of activities are to be allowed – pooling of most kinds is severely restrictive to the 
market freedom of the undertakings involved and is therefore in direct contradiction to 
Article 81(1) EC. Outside consortia or conferences, pools are so restrictive to competition 
that in my opinion their appearance is unlikely. Being paid on a pre-defined basis makes 
for scant dedication to outdoing expectations or delivering better services. Given this, one 
could question whether the spirit of Article 81(3) EC has been maintained through Article 
3(2)(d) of Regulation 823/2000.  
 
6.4.1 Article 81(3) EC and Article 3(2)(d) of Regulation 823/2000  
 
The first requirement of Article 81(3) EC is that there is a contribution to “improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”. This 
has been interpreted above as ‘gains in efficiency’ and a broad interpretation has emerged 
within the enforcers of Community competition law. Revenue pools create predictability 
for members. This might allow members to budget better for the coming year or take 
greater risks in other areas of business. This is in addition to greater logistical ease and 
increases in purchasing and bargaining power already mentioned. These gains must be 
demonstrable and clearly linked to the revenue pooling arrangement.  
 
Secondly, the flexible amount of a ‘fair share’ of benefits should be passed on to 
consumers – transport users. Revenue pools, in increasing the predictability of a line’s 
operations, could be said to enhance the regularity of services. This is a benefit which, 
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through decisional practice, the Commission has stated satisfies Article 81(3) EC.133 It has 
been stated in the opening to this section that revenue pools make the type of cargo less 
important to lines – that their income is calculated on a pre-defined set of rules. For such 
cargoes, the benefits are presumably substantial. Their cargo competes for space on vessels 
on a less uneven footing with all other cargo. Needless to say, factors like physical ease of 
carriage would decrease the allure of such cargo. But the mere fact that low freight rates are 
customary for such cargoes would no longer be a factor. Demonstrating these benefits to 
transport users and convincing any enforcement authority of their worthiness, given the 
potentially severe restriction to competition imbued by revenue pools, would be a tough, 
though not impossible task in the absence of the consortia block exemption.  
 
Of course, the benefits felt by shippers would depend on the exact details of the revenue 
pool in question. If the money pooled is only a fraction of profits to cover, say, port 
facilities, the restriction to competition is minimal and the benefits to transport users 
greater. So, any general position has to bear in mind the high level of diversity in liner 
shipping revenue pools. This consideration also rings true for the two negative 
requirements of Article 81(3) EC. Only by examining a particular revenue pool agreement 
or consortia agreement could one say if it contained any dispensable requirements. If so, an 
exemption for the agreement would not be available. The market conditions, as well as the 
terms of the agreement, would dictate whether or not a substantial elimination of 
competition would occur. The economic analysis would have to be detailed enough to 
examine what actual, potential, direct or indirect competition there is. There is no general 
reason why revenue pools cannot fulfil the two negative requirements of Article 81(3) EC.  
 
The consortia block exemption as a whole represents a benefit to transport users, of that 
there can be no doubt. And revenue pools play a role within consortia as means to ends. 
Without pooling revenue, lines might find it difficult to offer other services jointly, as 
allowed under Chapter II of Regulation 823/2000. The benefits because of consortia are the 
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reason why the block exemption exists. Revenue pools themselves, as an integral part in 
offering these benefits, need not demonstrate them explicitly.  
 
But for all of the checks and balances that Article 81(3) EC would place on revenue pools 
if applied directly, Article 3(2)(d) of Regulation 823/2000 merely states that revenue pools 
may be participated in. However, the qualifications to the block exemption appear later – 
particularly in Articles 5 and 6. Where Article 81(3) EC requires that the agreement does 
not allow the possibility of competition being eliminated, Articles 5 of Regulation 
823/2000 requires that effective competition is maintained, within or without conferences. 
In furtherance of this aim, Article 6 stipulates certain percentage market shares that 
consortia must remain within. Even is there is some doubt as to the ‘effectiveness’ of the 
competition under Article 5, Article 6 demand that such competition still accounts for a 
large part of the market. Thus competition on a market in which a consortium operates, is 
maintained and the last requirement of Article 81(3) EC is satisfied. The requirement that 
revenue pools do not contain dispensable restrictions to competition can only be 
determined by looking at the terms of the pool under the consortium arrangement.  
 
Finally, consortia are bound to allow their members to offer transport users individual 
service contracts.134 They are also bound to consult shippers on a regular basis.135 The 
framework within which consortia operate is thus very much in the interests of shippers. 
The practical consequence of this is that revenue pooling actually can affect shippers only 
very little. Despite the restriction of competition and the effects that pooling revenue might 
have on the quality of service, transport users still have the opportunity to demand certain 
levels of service and individually tailored arrangements through individual service 
contracts and consultations.   
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6.4.2 Summary  
 
The pooling of revenue is highly restrictive of competition. Despite this fact, such 
agreements may fall within Article 81(3) EC. This is true to say both in general and for the 
block exemption they are afforded under Regulation 823/2000. Consortia must conform to 
conditions and obligations that make sure the fundamental aspects of Article 81(3) EC are 
respected. The block exemption has to be viewed as a whole. In this way, the practice of 
revenue pooling itself becomes part of the larger picture of consortia: the benefits passed 
on to consumers are probably unaffected by what liner shipping companies do with their 
revenue but without that function, the more direct benefits they feel – the lower prices and 
regular services – might not happen at all.  
 
6.5 Multimodal transport  
 
Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of containerisation, notwithstanding the vessel 
changes discussed early on, is the ease with which fully integrated transport operations 
could then be carried out using two or more forms of transport. If liner shipping companies 
could agree to offer so-called ‘door to door’ transport services, the economies of scale seen 
under consortia could be take advantage of over the whole transport operation. The better 
deal for transport operators is already felt through individual companies offering transport 
services between almost any two places. Such operations by individual transport companies 
lack the collaboration necessary under Article 81(1) EC to be prohibited – they are not 
problematic from a competition law point of view. But collaboration between liner 
shipping companies, keen to expand their customer base and product range, does present 
such a problem.  
 
If liner shipping companies wished to enter the multimodal transport market together, any 
agreements would probably include similar provisions to that of a liner consortium. Joint 
facilities, coordination of services, pooling of vehicles, etc, would all be necessary. For the 
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same reason that liner consortia needed a block exemption, collaborative multimodal 
transport operations would require an exemption, individual or en masse, through Article 
81(3) EC. Aspects of liner shipping that have fallen foul of competition law in recent years, 
such as price fixing, would be highly unlikely to be tolerated on land, despite arguments 
that tolerance should be extended that far.136  
 
6.5.1 Exclusion from Regulation 823/2000  
 
The scope of Regulation 823/2000 appears in strict terms. Article 1 states that the block 
exemption applies only to consortia that operate “liner transport services from or to one or 
more Community ports.” This clearly places multimodal transport outside the Regulation 
on two counts – ports are where the journey start and finish and the mode of transport liner 
vessel. The important connection between the scope of the Council’s enabling regulation, 
Regulation 479/92 and the liner consortia block exemption should also be made.137 Only 
“maritime transport services” are covered.138 The scope of the liner consortia block 
exemption cannot therefore include land transport.  
 
Dinger notes the European Parliament’s involvement in the first consortia block exemption, 
where that institution opined that a general, cross industry approach towards multimodal 
transport was the best way forward.139 But this cross-industry approach, having had the 
effect of removing multimodal transport from the Commission’s draft legislation on 
consortia, has not emerged as of yet. Lacking such a block exemption, multimodal services 
could be offered with an individual assessment under Article 81(3) EC.  
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6.5.2 Consortia style multimodal transport under Article 81(3) EC  
 
Agreeing to offer multimodal services through cooperation similar to consortia is a clear 
restriction of competition, in the same way that consortia are. But they might be excused of 
that fact should Article 81(3) EC be satisfied. The process to an individual exemption is 
more appealing than prior to Regulation 1/2003 and the advent of self assessment under 
Article 81(3) EC.  
 
The benefits of multimodal services, like the benefits of consortia, are clear. And that those 
benefits are passed on to consumers is also clear…potentially. In the absence of controls 
and checks on the ability of liner shipping companies to restrict competition, one might 
presume that they would do so. Any undertakings could be tempted to restrict competition 
further if offering services similar to multimodal transport, so integrated as they are. But 
liner shipping has shown a particular fondness of competitive restrictions. Being treated in 
an according manner would be justifiable.  
 
As has been said before, the two negative requirements in Article 81(3) EC can only be 
discussed in individual cases. Liner shipping companies agreeing to offer rail, road or air 
transport in addition to maritime services would have to make sure that their collaboration 
does not contain elements beyond what is necessary. It would also be required that it is not 
possible that competition be eliminated from the market.  
 
Agreements between liner shipping undertakings could satisfy Article 81(3) EC, but only 
after presuming that certain details are present, such as the elimination of competition, 
controls over market share or the indispensability of restrictions. In the absence of guidance 
from the Commission in the form of a block exemption, any attempt to agree to offer door 
to door services would be a high risk from a competition law perspective.  
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6.5.3 Other arguments related to granting multimodal transport a block exemption  
 
In addition to the possibility that multimodal transport services possible fall within Article 
81(3) EC, one could argue that liner shipping companies might already be operating such 
services. The very nature of liner consortia, operating as they sometimes do out of joint 
port facilities, lends itself nicely to competition law infringements.140 Goods going in and 
out of the same warehouses might easily be packed onto the same heavy goods vehicles by 
employees who have agreed, at some of the very lowest levels, that such an arrangement 
would be beneficial. It would be logical to bring such infringements under a regulated 
exemption.  
 
Furthermore, although tenuously, consortia could argue that they are treated unfairly. In 
relation to other modes of transport, when it comes to multimodal operations, many 
companies outside the maritime sector can easily offer multimodal services. Yet consortia, 
according to Recital 16 of Regulation 823/2000, have to compete with such undertakings, 
“where appropriate”.141 This argument loses momentum, of course, when the words “where 
appropriate” are considered – any transport to places outside the hinterland to a given port 
is probably not part of the same market. Besides this, maritime transport brings a whole 
different set of economic considerations to bear that probably mean it does not compete 
with road, rail or air transport in the majority of cases.142 One such example might be the 
volume of goods that can be carried, an equivalent of which is simply not possible in air 
transport.  
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6.5.4 Summary  
 
Multimodal transport operations potentially satisfy the requirements of Article 81(3) EC. 
But clear guidelines from the Commission would be required prior to undertakings from all 
sectors feeling able to pursue such a strategy.  
 
In my opinion, multimodal services should be included in a block exemption with a cross-
industry approach. Placing such an exemption within the consortia block exemption is one 
possibility. This approach could be said to be unfair to other forms of transport because that 
legislation is shipping-focused. But placing it with consortia would have the advantage of 
keeping the maritime sector at least in the same regulation, and also keeping the same 
control mechanisms that are there for consortia, for multimodal transport. One also has to 
consider who the likely operators of truly integrated multimodal transport services are 
going to be. The power of liner shipping companies relative to, for example, road hauliers, 
is huge and perhaps justifies attention on their activities.  
 
Needless to say, to follow this approach would require a re-working of the consortia block 
exemption. This could prove to be a complicated task if the proposal is to offer an 
exemption to all operators of transport services to agree to offer multimodal transport. Such 
complications might indicate that an entirely separate block exemption for multimodal 
services is needed. Whatever the Community’s response is, the European Parliament most 
likely gauged the problem correctly in requesting that the approach taken be cross-industry.  
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Competition law in the European Community as it applies to collaboration in liner shipping 
is currently made up of a patchwork of legislation. Article 81 of the Treaty, interpreted 
through case law and decisional practice, is fully applicable to maritime transport. The 
conference and consortia block exemption have each been in place for many years and 
contain detailed rules on the regulation of the maritime transport sector. However, from 
October 2008, only the consortia block exemption will remain. The way cleared by 
Regulation 1/2003, the ‘modernisation regulation’, will ease the application of Article 81 
EC to liner shipping. But, in the introduction of self assessment, that legislation has made it 
important that liner shipping undertakings are fully aware of their obligations, to ensure 
compliance.  
 
The overriding message through this assessment of liner shipping under Article 81 EC has 
been the importance of Article 81(3) EC. Following October 2008, and in the wake of 
Regulation 1419/2006, a simpler system of Community competition law will emerge with 
regard to maritime transport. This system will have a focus on economies of scale and the 
greater use of technical agreements. Undertakings can ensure compliance through attention 
paid to the block exemptions and, in particular, Article 81(3) EC. Block exemptions being 
based thereon, following its provisions will leave little doubt as to the validity of any 
agreements that are potentially restrictive of competition.  
 
The simpler regime will also be a more realistic one than what has gone before under liner 
conferences. The days of price fixing had been numbered for a long time and the repeal of 
Council Regulation 4056/86 demonstrates the fundamental nature of Article 81(3) EC. 
Conferences never really attained compliance with that provision. That agreements in liner 
shipping have at their centre Article 81(3) has been demonstrated through the analysis in 
 NNN
this paper. Capacity management agreements and service arrangements between groups of 
lines and transport users are only available within the frameworks of consortia and 
conferences. The same is true for revenue pooling arrangements. This appears to be 
because of the checks and balances that appear in the block exemptions for consortia and 
conferences. The conditions and obligations contained in Regulation 4056/86 and 
Regulation 823/2000 reflect Article 81(3) EC. The most visible example of that seen in this 
paper could be the limits on market shares of consortia, ensuring that “effective 
competition” remains on the markets in which they operate, thereby observing Article 
81(3) EC.  
 
Of course, agreements, decisions and concerted practices sometimes do not need exempting 
at all. In such situations, Article 81(3) EC is redundant because Article 81(1) EC is not 
applicable. This is the case with many technical agreements, representative perhaps of 
many agreements made between lines in ports. So long as Article 81(1) EC is not 
applicable, lines will have ensured competition law compliance be it regarding port, vessel, 
cargo or other arrangements. But there may be borderline cases and then guidance from the 
Commission and enforcement authorities is important. This might be the case with regard 
to agreements to offer multimodal transport. There is not yet a regime regulating such 
operations but perhaps should be for clarity’s sake. 
 
It will be interesting to note whether conferences find a means to live on, perhaps 
maintaining their impact on the Community through nearby jurisdiction with more lenient 
approaches to their activities. The international community has many different regimes, 
many allowing conferences to operate freely. The extent to which other jurisdictions follow 
suit with the EC in banning conferences and price fixing or, like the USA, simply make 
them less appealing than the alternatives, remains to be seen. Perhaps in the coming years, 
shifts in the Community’s stance towards consortia will also occur. It might even be that in 
the absence of conferences some provisions, that ensure continuity between them and 
consortia, are unnecessary.  
 
 OOO
The dangers that are presented to liner shipping undertakings by Article 81 EC are 
profound. Compliance now, more than, ever, has to be a priority as self assessment is 
mixed with a perceived stronger enforcement approach by the Commission.143 It will be 
important for lines to observe Article 81(3) EC with great attention, a job that will be 
helped by Commission guidelines, expected some time this year.  
 
 
 
                                                 
143 DLA Shipping and Offshore seminar,  Oslo, 18/04/2007  
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